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First In, First Out: Promises and Problems of 




“Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely 
according to conscience, above all liberties.”  
                                John Milton, Areopagitica (1644)1 
“All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the 
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people.”      
                                     John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859)2   
For centuries, advocates for societal change have sought greater 
legal protections for freedom of expression.  Some of the most 
influential revolutions from the past three hundred years arose in 
significant measure from citizens demanding such safeguards, risking 
their lives to attack existing regimes, and demanding that their 
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 1.  Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton, reprinted in JOHN MILTON PROSE: 
MAJOR WRITINGS ON LIBERTY, POLITICS, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION 209 (David Loewenstein, 
ed., 2013) (1644) . 
 2.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5 (H.O. Houghton, 2d ed. 1863) (1859). 
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government grant the people this liberty. Promises of enhanced 
freedom of expression were, for instance, at the forefront of messages 
that galvanized revolutionary efforts in eighteenth-century North 
America and France, twentieth-century Russia and Cuba, and twenty-
first century Egypt and Tunisia.3  In each of these successful uprisings, 
rebels ardently supported new leaders who repeatedly vowed to 
expand the legal latitude for people to express themselves without fear 
of government-imposed sanctions.4     
After the revolution, however, all of these governments quickly 
changed course.5  Before long, the new leaders who rose to the top 
through the backing of a citizenry that devoured their promises—
including their paeans to free speech and expression—vigorously 
instituted their own measures abridging the general public’s ability to 
speak and express.6  State control of speech and expression developed 
and spread, governmental actors imposed harsh punishments upon 
people who defied these restrictions, and the revolutionary assurances 
of legally protected communications soon became a distant and 
presumably unobtainable memory.7   
This article looks closely at this centuries-old phenomenon and 
proposes some explanations for its recurrence.  By studying six 
revolutions that began with popular demands for greater freedom of 
expression and pledges from revolutionary leaders to enhance this 
liberty, and concluded with a state-inflicted backlash against freedom 
of expression shortly after the revolution ended, this article examines 
the mechanics of free expression’s “first in, first out” role in these 
struggles.  Discerning common trends among these revolutions that 
vary so greatly in time period, geographic area, and affected culture 
sheds some light upon freedom of expression’s apparent role as a 
promise that revolutionary leaders easily make and easily break, and 
as an objective that many citizens easily abandon in post-revolutionary 
societies.   
Part I of this article discusses the central role that freedom of 
expression played as a popular demand and a political promise in the 
buildup to the American Revolution of 1783, the French Revolution of 
1789, the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, 
 
 3.  See infra Part I.   
 4.  See infra Part I. 
 5.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7.  See infra Part II. 
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and the “Arab Spring” revolutions of 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia.8  Part 
II moves to the aftermath of these six revolutions, and explores the 
various limitations and punishments that the post-revolutionary 
governments installed to abridge the freedom of expression that these 
leaders had so recently pledged to protect.9  Lastly, Part III draws upon 
this historical summary to describe common factors and trends leading 
to the rapid post-revolutionary reduction of legal protections for 
speech and expression.10   
This examination proves that throughout the centuries, and across 
a tremendous range of nations and cultures, revolutionary leaders who 
vow legal protections for freedom of expression utilize similar devices 
of power and play upon analogous popular sympathies to rapidly 
retract this promised freedom without sparking a new rebellion.  
Through this discussion, this article illuminates larger truths about the 
spectrum of needs among citizens in a post-revolutionary society, and 
the overall value within this spectrum that the public generally places 
upon freedom of expression in their daily lives.           
I.  FIRST IN: PRE-REVOLUTIONARY DEMANDS AND REVOLUTIONARY 
PROMISES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION  
A.  North America, 1783 
Freedom of expression was far from a foreign concept in colonial 
America.11  On the contrary, historical evidence reveals that American 
revolutionaries rebelling against the British Crown believed they were 
preserving a right of Englishmen that existed to a certain extent in law 
and to a greater extent in practice.12  English legal scholar William 
Blackstone, in his 1769 treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
declared freedom of the press “essential to the nature of a free state.”13  
Even earlier, in the mid-1690s, the English Parliament had rejected a 
proposal to renew the governmental system of “licensing” all printed 
texts from any British subject before publication, a practice that had 
 
 8.  See infra Part I. 
 9.  See infra Part II. 
 10.  See infra Part III. 
 11.  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 21 (1965).  
 12.  KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 1 (2004).   
 13.  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND vol. IV, at 151 
(1978).   
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existed in Great Britain for more than a century.14  The Declaration of 
Rights in 1689 prevented prosecution of any British subject petitioning 
the King regarding a perceived royal wrongdoing.15  Furthermore, 
members of Parliament, as the representatives of the people, held 
immunity from prosecution for statements made about governmental 
leaders, current events, and other matters of governance.16   
On the other hand, as Professor Leonard Levy and other scholars 
have pointed out, the laws of colonial America did not honor a right to 
free expression that comes remotely close to today’s safeguards under 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.17  Instead, the 
prevailing legal views of the colonial era permitted the government to 
punish a wide range of post-spoken or post-publication forms of 
expression.18  For example, English common law recognized the crime 
of seditious libel, punishing subjects of the Crown who criticized the 
government to the point of lowering its esteem in the public eye.19  
Truth of the critique was not a viable defense.20  Further chilling speech 
and expression was the transgression of “constructive treason,” 
allowing the government to prosecute for the high crime of treason any 
individual who expressed anti-government sentiments.21  Even 
Blackstone wrote that freedom of the press did not protect against 
 
 14.  David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 
443 (1983).  However, attempts to reintroduce licensing or other forms of government-held 
prior restraints continued for more than two decades after Parliament rejected renewal of the 
licensing act.  Id. at 444.  
 15.  An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession 
of the Crown, 1689, Bill of Rights (Eng.) (“That it is the right of the subjects to petition the 
king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.”).  
 16.  WERHAN, supra note 12, at 1. 
 17.  E.g., JAMES A. CURRY, RICHARD B. RILEY & RICHARD M. BATTISONI, 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 436–38 (1989); LEONARD LEVY, 
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 19–
20, 55, 85–86 (1960); ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2007) (“Colonial America began with little tolerance 
of dissent.”); Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 
1156, 1173–74 (1986). 
 18.  WERHAN, supra note 12, at 6 (“Mainstream legal thought in the American colonies, 
as in England, assumed not only that individuals were free to speak their minds, but also that 
they were legally accountable for the harmful tendencies of their speech.”). 
 19.  RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, 
“OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF 
GRIEVANCES 74 (2012).   
 20.  Ronald W. Eades, The Control of Seditious Libel as a Basis for the Development of 
the Law of Obscenity, 11 AKRON L. REV. 29, 32 (1977).   
 21.  ALFRED H. KNIGHT, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: THE PEOPLE AND CASES THAT HAVE 
SHAPED OUR SOCIETY, FROM KING ALFRED TO RODNEY KING 143 (1996). 
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“censure for criminal matter” after publication.22     
In spite of these legal limits, however, robust discourse about 
matters of public concern existed largely unfettered in the thirteen 
colonies.23  In fact, Professor Keith Werhan notes that speech and 
expression in the colonies likely “was far freer than in the mother 
country.”24  One can witness the truth of this statement within the 
outrage among so many American colonists after Great Britain used 
the “Intolerable Acts” to limit town meetings in Massachusetts, 
demonstrating that the colonists already recognized a tradition of open 
gatherings in which individuals spoke without censorship about 
political affairs.25  Similarly, the fact that the revolutionary leaders 
openly discussed their opposition to the new British laws in 
convocations from the Stamp Act Congress to the First Continental 
Congress—and voiced that opposition without facing conviction for 
treason—indicates that an atmosphere of at least some of freedom 
expression existed in the colonies before the Revolution even began.26 
England’s geographic distance from North America caused 
unwieldy governance in which the colonists could to a certain extent 
ignore the laws and precepts of England.27  Historians generally accept 
that this distance led to the growth of a separate American identity, 
strengthening the overall belief that revolution against the Crown was 
necessary to retain that individuality in the world.28  Free speech and 
 
 22.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 151–52.   
 23.  See, e.g., DAVID A. COPELAND, DEBATING THE ISSUES IN COLONIAL NEWSPAPERS: 
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD 10–12 (2000) (listing and quoting excerpts 
from several publically published and disseminated defenses of freedom of speech, the press, 
and general expression in the colonies); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 46 (2000); 
LARRY ELDRIDGE, A DISTANT HERITAGE: THE GROWTH OF FREE SPEECH IN EARLY AMERICA 3 
(1994) (“[C]olonists experienced a dramatic expansion of their freedom to criticize 
government and its officials across the seventeenth century.”); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural 
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 911 (1993) (stating that 
some Americans around the time of the Revolution went as far as calling for “a freedom to 
speak and publish as one pleases”); Bogen, supra note 14, at 433–34 (describing the success 
of colonial local assemblies in establishing guarantees for free expression in legislative debate, 
paralleling the British parliamentary privilege). 
 24.  WERHAN, supra note 12, at 6.   
 25.  See, e.g., KENNETH J. MOYNIHAN, A HISTORY OF WORCESTER 1674–1848, at 72–73 
(describing one Massachusetts town’s rebellion against this act, including creating new local 
political institutions that could hold meetings about the issues of the day). 
 26.  JOSEPH C. MORTON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 33–35 (2003); EDWARD 
COUNTRYMAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58 (2003). 
 27.  Id. at 33–34. 
 28.  Id.; see also ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT F. H. . .BERT, A HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND METHOD 64 (6th ed. 2014).   
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expression in a higher degree than what English common law 
specifically allowed was part of that new American identity.29  Many 
of the American Revolution’s intellectual leaders were well-versed in 
the philosophers of the European Enlightenment movement, 
individuals such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Baron de 
Montesquieu.30  Overall, Enlightenment theorists held as a central 
precept that the best governments were based on principles of reason 
and rationale rather than absolute authority and tradition.31  Extending 
this concept into practical governance, many Enlightenment writers 
stated that good governments protected certain natural laws, rights that 
inherently belong to all men.32  Early American leaders generally 
agreed that at least some degree of freedom of expression was a natural 
law that government needed to safeguard.33 
Notably, these individuals typically did not call for unlimited 
freedom of speech and expression.34  However, most American 
revolutionaries of this era perceived free speech and expression as a 
natural law and demanded the formation of a government that would 
promise protection of those inherent liberties.35  An example of this 
 
 29.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Another key sign pointing to the increasing 
colonial desire for freedom of expression came from the trial of printer John Peter Zenger for 
seditious libel in 1735. Zenger was acquitted when twelve New York jurors ignored the 
judge’s instructions regarding the crime of seditious libel, adopting instead the arguments 
raised by Zenger’s lawyers that the truth of Zenger’s statements against the colonial governor 
general provided a valid defense. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE BIRTH OF THE NATION 
163 (1969). See generally A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER 
ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW-YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL: WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS (2010). 
Still another influential defense of free expression came from Benjamin Franklin, whose 
Apology for Printers in 1731 defended the dissemination of multiple competing viewpoints as 
benefiting society overall. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 108–9 (Stephen L. 
Vaughn ed., 2008). 
 30.  See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 13, 18–19 (1996); Bruce W. Sanford & Jane E. Kirtley, The First 
Amendment Tradition and its Critics, in THE PRESS 264 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson eds., 2005). 
 31.  See GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM: PUBLIC REASON AS 
A POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT 1–2, 4–5 (2003). 
 32.  See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ECONOMIC THOUGHT BEFORE ADAM SMITH: AN 
AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT vol. I, at 369 (1995).   
 33.  Hamburger, supra note 23, at 919.   
 34.  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 22 (1971); LEVY, supra note 17, at vii. 
 35.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 132–
33 (1993) (stating that at minimum, the Framers of the United States Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights wanted to prevent the government from enacting laws that would “shut off dissent 
or to insulate itself from criticism”); THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: THE FIRST 200 YEARS 
43 (Richard C. Simmons ed., 1989) (“During the subsequent congressional debate over the 
Bill of Rights, [James] Madison identified freedom of speech and of the press as among ‘the 
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commitment comes from the First Continental Congress’s Appeal to 
the Inhabitants of Quebec in 1774, which, on the topic of freedom of 
the press, states:  
The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, 
science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal 
sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready 
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential 
promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are 
shamed and intimated, into more honourable and just modes of 
conducting affairs.36     
One can reasonably draw parallels between this promise of a new 
government guaranteeing freedom of expression and the far more 
famous promises of these liberties in the Constitution and the First 
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.  For example, the Constitution’s 
definition of the crime of treason is considerably more limited than the 
English common law definition, guarding against the offense of 
“constructive treason” that hampered free speech and expression under 
British rule.37  Likewise, the Constitution’s “Speech and Debate 
Clause” provides members of Congress immunity from prosecution for 
remarks made in carrying out their legislative duties, a carryover from 
the similar privilege in English common law.38 
Yet no promise to preserve freedom of speech and expression 
resonated more than the First Amendment’s guarantee of these 
liberties, a statement beginning with the pronouncement that 
“Congress shall make no law” abridging the rights protected therein.39 
As discussed earlier, the intent behind this broad and seemingly 
definitive language likely was not as absolute as the words outwardly 
imply.40 Still, the mere presence of protections for speech and the press 
 
most valuable on the whole list’.”); STEPHEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
44 (2008) (stating that although the Framers understood that some speech could be regulated 
to protect other rights, freedom of speech was at its core a natural right).  
 36.  Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec 
(Oct. 26, 1774), reprinted in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 693, 695 
(1999). 
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
 38.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 39.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 40.  However, some of the Framers pushed for considerably broader constitutional 
language regarding the protections of speech and expression. For instance, James Madison’s 
original version of what would become the First Amendment “impl[ied] a bar on all federal 
authority respecting speech of press.” LEVY, supra note 17, at 279, 278–80.  During the 
Constitutional Convention itself, Elbridge Gerry and Charles Pinckney sought to introduce a 
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at the outset of the Bill of Rights — a document that many 
revolutionary leaders demanded before they would agree to the 
Constitution on the whole — represents a substantial vow from the 
governors of this new nation to protect these rights for all of its 
citizens.  
B.  France, 1789 
Much like the desire for protecting freedom of expression 
manifested itself during discussions about the Stamp Act and other 
financial matters prior to the American Revolution, one of the first 
outcries for freedom of political expression in France arose out of fiscal 
issues.  By the 1780s, France’s economic situation was perilous, a 
condition due largely to the nation’s participation in several costly 
wars and the extravagance of the royal court.41  When King Louis XVI 
summoned the Estates-General—a political body that purportedly 
represented the interests of the clergy, the nobility, and the common 
people of France—to chart France’s financial future, national elections 
for representatives were necessary since this legislative entity had not 
met since 1614.42  
During these elections, Louis XVI took the surprising step of 
suspending censorship of publications, even allowing writings that 
criticized the monarchy.43  As a result of the king’s decision, France 
was deluged with pamphlets and newspapers calling for a social and 
economic overhaul of the entire country.44  This concept of a free press 
went against the historic limitations on spoken or printed words that 
defiled certain sacrosanct aspects of French life, particularly the 
Catholic clergy—who were seen as guardians of moral, honorable, and 
orderly living—and the monarchy, viewed as the supreme authority 
safeguarding this traditional way of life.45    
 
provision that freedom of the press “be inviolably preserved.”  Fred B. Hart, Power of 
Government Over Speech and Press, 29 YALE L.J. 410 (1920). 
 41.  Eugene Nelson White, The French Revolution and the Politics of Government 
Finance, 1770–1815, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 227, 229 (1995); Thomas J. Sargent & Francois R. 
Velde, Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution, 103 J. POL. ECON. 474, 474–75 
(1995).   
 42.  FLORIN AFTALION, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 29 
(1987).   
 43.  A COMPANION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 443 (Peter McPhee ed., 2012); SEAN 
CONNOLLY, WITNESS TO HISTORY: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 10 (2003).   
 44.  CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 10. 
 45.  See generally CHARLES WALTON, POLICING PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION: THE CULTURE OF CALUMNY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17–37 (2009); 
POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW 3/16/2017  3:03 PM 
2016] FIRST IN, FIRST OUT 115 
 
However, the desire to speak and publish freely was not foreign 
to French intellectuals of this era.  Inspired by many of the same 
Enlightenment philosophers who instigated the American movement 
for independence, a growing number of French thinkers were by this 
point advocating for the reasoned governance that Voltaire, 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and their brethren had supported.46 State-
sponsored censorship of all opposing views was, to them, an example 
of irrational government.47 The success of the American Revolution in 
toppling a regime that was perceived as illogical only buoyed the 
growing spirit in France that complete social change, including 
increased legal protections for speech and expression, was possible 
now.48   
Among the greatest champions of freedom of expression was the 
newspaper publisher Jacques-Pierre Brissot.49 In 1784, Brissot had 
served time in the infamous French prison, the Bastille, for publishing 
pamphlets criticizing the government in general and Queen Marie 
Antoinette in particular.50 After his release, he traveled to the fledgling 
United States of America.51 When Louis XVI announced that he would 
convene the Estates-General, however, Brissot returned to France, 
launching a newspaper titled The French Patriot in the summer of 
 
Esther Janssen, Limits to Expression on Religion in France, 5 J. EUR. STUD. 22, 24–25 (2009), 
http://www.ivir.nl/medewerkerpagina/janssen (noting that Catholicism functioned as the 
official state religion of France until the Revolution, and that France criminalized the offense 
of blasphemy against the church and its values until this law was abolished in 1791).   
 46.  See ARTHUR DONOVAN, ANTOINE LAVOISIER: SCIENCE, ADMINISTRATION, AND 
REVOLUTION 247 (1993); Harold J. Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 569, 616 (1984). 
 47.  Again, however, these philosophers did not advocate for an absolute prohibition of 
restrictions upon speech and expression. Instead, they generally supported the notion that the 
general public’s ability to speak and express could be lawfully abridged when such speech and 
expression could legitimately damage the state. See, e.g., Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau, 
Constant, and the Emergence of the Modern Notion of Freedom of Speech, in FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 133–36 (Elizabeth Powers ed., 2011).   
 48.  Susheel K. Sharma, The American War of Independence and the French Revolution: 
A Study in Influence, in THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY AND INFLUENCE ON LITERATURE 
61 (T.R. Sharma ed., 1991).   
 49.  Jonathan Israel, Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French 
Revolution, INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDY, Spring 2014, https://www.ias.edu/ias-letter/israel-
revolutionary-ideas (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
 50.  For one of several discussions about the impact of this prison term upon Brissot’s 
revolutionary inclinations, see Simon Burrows, The Innocence of Jacques-Pierre Brissot, 46 
HISTORICAL J. 843, 845, 853–54 (2003). Ultimately, the author concludes that “[Brissot’s] 
arbitrary arrest, together with the calumnies and evidence fabricated against him, had helped 
to forge the revolutionary.” Id. at 871.  
 51.  THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 294 (David Andress ed., 2015) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION].   
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1789.52 Around that same time, he submitted a treatise to the Estates-
General in which he declared liberty of the press “a natural right of 
man.”53  In this document, he also defended preserving the theatre’s 
freedom from censorship, stating that drama could greatly influence 
the citizenry’s comprehension about matters of public concern.54  
Brissot was hardly alone in this position.55 As the debates within 
the Estates-General mushroomed from questions about France’s 
economic problems into broader social and political issues, it became 
increasingly clear that many individuals supported loosening restraints 
on free speech and expression.56 By the summer of 1789,  free speech 
and expression represented one of several ideas that the existing 
regime could no longer afford to ignore.57 
Importantly, though, France’s outspoken proponents of free 
speech and expression had varying ideas about what this concept 
should mean. Brissot represented one pole of this debate, joined by 
individuals like philosopher Jacques Andre Naigeon and dramatist 
Marie-Joseph Chénier in calling for a virtually absolute legal 
protection of free speech and expression.58 Most of the French 
revolutionaries, however, advocated for a less extreme interpretation 
of these principles, warning that unlimited freedom of speech and 
expression could encourage deception, incitement to violence, and 
other ugly results.59 A number of French thinkers retained a belief that 
 
 52.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AGE OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS AND NEW IDEOLOGIES, 1760–
1815, at 87 (Gregory Fremont-Barnes ed., vol. 1, 2007) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS]. 
 53.  Israel, supra note 49. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  See, e.g., A COMPANION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION note 43, at 443 (“[W]hen the 
Estates-General convened, several individuals challenged existing restrictions on newspapers 
(royal privileges and censorship) by publishing newspapers to report on events regardless of 
the consequences. By the summer of 1789 all such restrictions had fallen by the wayside.”). 
 56.  See, e.g., Berman, supra note 46, at 620 n.60 (quoting E.J. LOWELL, THE EVE OF THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION 324 (1892) (“In the decay of religious ideas, the Frenchmen of the 
eighteenth century had set up a comparison independent of revelation. They had found it in 
public opinion. The sociable population of Paris was ready to accept the common voice as 
arbiter.”). 
 57.  See Israel, supra note 49 (“By July 1789, the month of the storming of the Bastille, 
the question was no longer whether revolutionary France should possess freedom of 
expression and of the press—all the revolutionaries then agreed that it should—but rather 
whether this freedom required limits.”). 
 58.  Id.; SUSAN MASLAN, REVOLUTIONARY ACTS: THEATER, DEMOCRACY, AND THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION 30–31 (2005). 
 59.  See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at 375; Israel, 
supra note 49; WALTON, supra note 45, at 39, 47. 
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the government could still punish “calumny”—speech or expression 
that caused injury to the broader society—as long as the state did not 
engage in pre-publication censorship.60  
Nevertheless, by the time Louis XVI dismissed and banished his 
finance minister on July 11, 1789, there was little doubt that free 
speech and expression were high on the list of demands from the 
Frenchmen calling for change.61 Three days later, the storming of the 
Bastille highlighted a bloody revolt on the streets of Paris, ultimately 
forcing Louis XVI to yield to the sovereignty of the people.62 As the 
revolution spread into the French countryside and peasants took up 
arms against their lords, the National Constituent Assembly—the new 
configuration of the Estates-General63—issued a declaration that the 
feudal system in France was over.64  
The revolution’s most important recognition of free speech and 
expression, however, emerged later that month.  On August 26, the 
Assembly introduced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen, proclaiming the principles by which post-revolutionary France 
would abide.65 Two of its seventeen articles centered specifically on 
free speech and expression. Article 10 stated that no person “should be 
disturbed for his opinions, even in religion, provided that their 
manifestation does not trouble public order as established by law.”66 
Even more emphatically, Article 11 declared “free communication of 
thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. 
Every citizen may therefore speak, write, and print freely, if he accepts 
his own responsibility for any abuse of this liberty in the cases set by 
the law .”67      
 
 60.  WALTON, supra note 45, at 4–5. 
 61.  See id. at 5 (noting that all three estates in the Estates-General possessed publically 
recognized advocates for freedom of the press); Israel, supra note 49; A COMPANION TO THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 43, at 499 (stating that freedom of expression and opinion 
was one of the bedrock goals of the French Revolution). 
 62.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 65–67.   
 63.  This represented far more than a mere change of name. By assuming the title of a 
“national assembly,” this group of deputies had declared itself a legislative body deriving 
power from the French populace, rather than taking authority exclusively from the king. Id. at 
275. 
 64.  Id. at 276. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  D. . .claration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 art. X (Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 art. X) (Fr.) (“Nul ne doit être inqui. . .t. . . pour ses 
opinions, même religieuses, pourvu que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l’ordre public . . . 
tabli par la Loi.”). 
 67.  Id. art. XI (“La libre communication des pens . . .es et des opinions est un des droits 
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Thus, the stage was set for France’s future. Speech and expression 
were officially proclaimed to be fundamental values in French society 
and in the world as a whole. However, these preservations came with 
limits, as the government could still outlaw and punish abusive speech 
and expression that “troubled public order.”68 However, the question 
of how this balance would play out between the French citizenry and 
the newly constituted French government remained to be seen.          
C.  Russia, 1905                 
Social unrest plagued the Russian Empire for many years before 
the Russian Revolution of 1905.69  A combination of harmful factors 
triggered this discontent with the czarist government, including 
famine, unemployment, government attempts at ethnic cleansing 
throughout the empire, state-imposed restrictions on academic 
freedom, and a series of largely disastrous attempts to industrialize 
Russia too quickly.70  Desperate for reform, peasant farmers staged 
protests, industrial workers formed illegal labor unions and engaged in 
large-scale strikes, university students drafted petitions and pamphlets 
condemning the czarist regime, and people from all walks of life 
marched in solidarity—and even engaged in full-scale riots—against 
the existing governmental conditions.71  Even state-inflicted measures 
as extreme as forced military service, expulsion, and exile for 
individuals engaging in these protests failed to end this growing stream 
of anti-government sentiment.72       
All of these tensions came to a head on January 22, 1905.73 
Approximately 150,000 people marched through St. Petersburg to the 
czar’s Winter Palace, carrying a petition stating that they would rather 
 
les plus pr. . .cieux de l’Homme: tout Citoyen peut donc parler, . . .crire, imprimer librement, 
sauf à r . . .pondre de l’abus de cette libert . . ., dans les cas d . . .termin. . .s par la Loi.”). 
 68.  Id. art. X.  
 69.  See e.g., William Elroy Curtis, The Revolution in Russia, NAT’L GEO. MAG., May 
1907, at 302.  
 70.  COMPETING VOICES FROM THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 7–8 (Michael C. Hickey ed., 
2011); JACKSON J. SPIELVOGEL, WESTERN CIVILIZATION 854–56 (8th ed. 2009); SHEILA 
FITZPATRICK, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 28 (2008); James D. White, The 1905 Revolution in 
Russia’s Baltic Provinces, in THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905: CENTENARY PERSPECTIVES 
59–61 (Anthony Heywood & Jonathan D. Smele, eds., 2005); RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN 
REVOLUTION 4–9, 119–20, 119, 143 (1990). 
 71.  See, e.g., SAMUEL D. KASSOW, STUDENTS, PROFESSORS, AND THE STATE IN TSARIST 
RUSSIA 251–55 (1989); PIPES, supra note 70, at 4–9; FITZPATRICK’, supra note 70, at 28; 
SPIEVOGEL, supra note 70, at 854–56.   
 72.  See, e.g., PIPES, supra note 70, at 6–8. 
 73.  FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 33.  
POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW 3/16/2017  3:03 PM 
2016] FIRST IN, FIRST OUT 119 
 
die than continue living in conditions of poverty and oppression, and 
containing several articles calling for change.74 The second article in 
the document demanded “[i]mmediate proclamation of the freedom 
and inviolability of the person, of freedom of speech and of the press, 
of freedom of assembly, and of freedom of conscience in matters of 
religion.”75    
““Here we seek our last salvation,” the petition concluded. “Do 
not refuse to come to the aid of your people . . . . Tear down the wall 
that separates you from your people and let it rule the country together 
with you.”76  Nothing in the petition called for Czar Nicholas II to 
abdicate his throne.77  Nevertheless, the czar considered the massive 
assemblage threatening, sending his armed troops into the streets.78  
Shots were fired, and by the end of the day, more than a hundred of the 
unarmed protestors lay dead, with many more wounded.79       
Soon after these killings, more than 400,000 Russian industrial 
workers went on strike.80  Peasants burned the homes of noblemen and 
engaged in other forms of protest, refusing to cease even after imperial 
police imposed harsh penalties upon them.81  Russian sailors mutinied 
on the battleship Potemkin in the Black Sea.82 Some universities shut 
their doors as students protestors walked out of their classrooms.83  
Middle-class workers demanded that the czar create a constituent 
assembly to ensure that the government respected the peoples’ 
wishes.84        
 
 74.  See PIPES, supra note 70, at 24–25.  
 75.  Petition Prepared for Presentation to Nicholas II, January 9, 1905 (Bloody Sunday), 
http://academic.shu.edu/russianhistory/index.php/Workers%27_Petition,_January_9th,_1905
_%28Bloody_Sunday%29.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  See id.  
 78.  PIPES, supra note 70, at 25.   
 79.  AMY NELSON, MUSIC FOR THE REVOLUTION: MUSICIANS AND POWER IN EARLY SOVIET 
RUSSIA 6 (2004); SIDNEY HARCAVE, FIRST BLOOD: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905 98–117 
(1964).   
 80.  PIPES, supra note 70, at 26.   
 81.  ABRAHAM ASCHER, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE 31–32 (2014); 
RICHARD S. WORTMAN, SCENARIOS OF POWER: MYTH AND CEREMONY IN THE RUSSIAN 
MONARCHY FROM PETER THE GREAT TO THE ABDICATION OF NICHOLAS II 362 (2013).   
 82.  See generally NEAL BASCOMB, RED MUTINY: ELEVEN FATEFUL DAYS ON THE 
BATTLESHIP POTEMKIN (2008) (describing the mutiny and its effect of emboldening leaders of 
the Revolution of 1905).   
 83.  KASSOW, supra note 71, at 195–97.  
 84.  DON C. RAWSON, RUSSIAN RIGHTISTS AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 26 (1995); 
BASCOMB, supra note 82, at 85, 204.   
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At first, Nicholas II ardently resisted adopting any changes that 
would limit his power to rule.85 Ultimately, however, the effects of 
nationwide strikes and persistent violence left him no other choice.86 
On October 17, 1905, the czar reluctantly issued a document now 
known as the “October Manifesto.”87 At the outset of this declaration, 
he guaranteed freedom of speech to all Russian citizens, along with the 
freedoms of assembly and association.88 The manifesto also created a 
representative legislative body in Russia, an entity that allegedly would 
limit the czar’s previously unchecked power and give a new voice to 
the general population.89 
The promises contained within this document effectively ended 
the Revolution of 1905.90 Strikes ended, violent outbreaks subsided, 
students returned to their university classrooms, and an overall mood 
of celebration arose among the revolutionaries.91 While they had not 
eliminated the existing regime, many of them believed that they had 
accomplished what they had set out to achieve: the assurance of 
fundamental individual liberties such as free speech and assembly, and 
the creation of a new governmental body that would be accountable to 
the people. Some revolutionary leaders, particularly the socialists, 
objected that the revolution had not succeeded, noting that the October 
Manifesto’s guarantee of free speech did not mean anything without 
concrete changes and pointing out that the new legislature still required 
the czar’s approval to pass laws.92 Overall, though, many Russians 
seemed to believe that their revolutionary struggle had ended with 
 
 85.  See, e.g., PIPES, supra note 70, at 43 (describing the czar’s reluctance to cede his 
absolute power in the wake of Bloody Sunday); Curtis, supra note 69, at 304–05 (asserting 
that Nicholas II’s closest advisor frequently told the czar that absolute rule was a gift to him 
from God and could not be shared with the people).  
 86.  KATHLEEN MALLEY-MORRISON, STATE VIOLENCE AND THE RIGHT TO PEACE: 
WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 64 (2009) (stating that Nicholas II issued the October 
Manifesto as a compromise only after he realized that no other way to retain power existed); 
ASCHER, supra note 81, at 36 (stating that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevch, one of Czar 
Nicholas II’s closest political advisors, threatened to shoot himself if the czar continued to 
refuse to compromise with the citizens).   
 87.  WORTMAN, supra note 81, at 363; FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 33.  
 88.  PIPES, supra note 70, at 43.  
 89.  WORTMAN, supra note 81, at 363. 
 90.  See FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 33–34; PIPES, supra note 70, at 44. 
 91.  GEOFFREY A. HOSKING, THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: GOVERNMENT 
AND DUMA, 1907-1914 29 (1973) (stating that most local governments throughout Russia 
accepted the October Manifesto as an adequate plan for the government’s future); ASCHER, 
supra note 81, at 36 (“Within days, most workers, who were beginning to suffer great 
hardships, returned to their jobs, even though it was not clear what powers the Tsar retained.”).   
 92.  BRUNO NAARDEN, SOCIALIST EUROPE AND REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA: PERCEPTION AND 
PREJUDICE 214 (1992); RICHARD CHARQUES, THE TWILIGHT OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA 137 (1974).  
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triumph, and that days of far greater liberty lay ahead.93  
D.  Cuba, 1959 
Most Cubans in the 1950s were not strangers to the concepts of 
protecting civil liberties, including freedom of expression.94  As early 
as 1869, the Constitution of Cuba provided legal safeguards for this 
liberty, along with the freedoms of peaceable assembly, teaching, 
religion, petition, and the press.95  The nation’s revised Constitution of 
1940 not only committed the government to preserving these 
freedoms, but added more individual liberties to the list as well, 
including the maintenance of free and open elections.96  Most Cubans 
appeared to take tremendous pride in their Constitution of 1940 and 
the democratic society that it promoted.97  “[Cuba] could rightfully 
claim its place alongside the select group of modern liberal 
constitutional democracies of the world,” explained historian Louis A. 
Perez in his book On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and 
Culture. “Constitutional legality, free elections, freedom of speech, 
and a free press were attributes of advanced civilizations by virtue of 
which Cubans claimed membership.”98    
One of the Constitution of 1940’s surprising sponsors was 
Fulgencio Batista, a political strongman who had steered the nation’s 
government since helping topple the nation’s military regime in 1933.99  
Appointing himself chief of the armed forces, Batista was the obvious 
power behind the throne for every Cuban president until winning 
election to the presidency himself in 1940.100 Still, his staunch support 
 
 93.  See HOSKING, supra note 91, at 29; ASCHER, supra note 81, at 36.   
 94.  See LOUIS A. PEREZ, ON BECOMING CUBAN: IDENTITY, NATIONALITY, AND CULTURE 
446–47 (2008); CLIFFORD L. STATEN, THE HISTORY OF CUBA 73 (2005); Nick Miroff, In 
Havana, a Renovation in Marble—and Maybe in Spirit, Too, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-havana-a-renovation-in-marble—
and-maybe-in-spirit-too/2015/01/29/8cd7a9f0-a723-11e4-a162-121d06ca77f1_story.html.  
 95.  See CONSTITUCION DE GUAIMARO, Apr. 10, 1869, art. 28.   
 96.  CUBAN CONSTITUTION OF 1940, art. 33, art. 35, art. 36, art. 101, art. 102, 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/constitution-1940.htm.   
 97.  See, e.g., SILVIA PEDRAZA, POLITICAL DISAFFECTION IN CUBA’S REVOLUTION AND 
EXODUS 41 (2007); K. LYNN STONER, FROM THE HOUSE TO THE STREETS: THE CUBAN WOMAN’S 
MOVEMENT FOR LEGAL REFORM, 1898-1940 183 (1991); Miroff, supra note 94 (describing the 
Constitution of 1940 as a “high-water mark” for recognizing civil liberties in Cuba).  
 98.  PEREZ, supra note 94, at 446–47.  
 99.  AVIVA CHOMSKY, A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 32 (2010).  
 100.  DANIEL C. HELLINGER, COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AT 
LAST? 285 (2014); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 61 (Spencer C. 
Tucker, ed., 2013) (hereinafter “ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY”); RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A 
NEW HISTORY 142–44 (2005).   
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of the progressive new constitution encouraged many Cuban 
citizens.101  A peaceful transfer of power after Batista lost the 1944 
presidential election to Ramon Grau San Martin appeared to be an even 
greater symbol of stability and democratization in Cuban 
governance.102   
Free elections occurred again in 1948, bringing into office a new 
president, Carlo Prio Socarras.103  Yet Socarras and his administration 
soon found themselves mired in scandals and corruption, causing many 
Cubans to lose faith in their leadership.104  Batista, who had moved to 
Florida after losing the 1944 election, returned to Cuba and announced 
his candidacy for the 1952 presidential race.105  When it became 
obvious that he would lose, the man who had vehemently advocated 
for the Constitution of 1940  violated virtually every principle for 
which that document stood.106  Four months before the Cuban election 
day, Batista staged a coup d’état, backed by both the Cuban military 
and the United States government.107  Exactly one hour and seventeen 
minutes later, Batista was Cuba’s new head of state.108      
From 1952 onward, Batista’s government increasingly 
suppressed the freedoms of speech, assembly, the press, and virtually 
every other civil liberties category that the Constitution of 1940 
protected.109  He promised to hold free elections in 1954, but his heavy-
 
 101.  See CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 32.  
 102.  See id.  
 103.  See THOMAS G. PATERSON, CONTESTING CASTRO: THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
TRIUMPH OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 26 (1995). 
 104.  Id. (Grau and Prio swelled the civil service with political appointees eager to make 
money for themselves; public officials raided pension funds and the treasuries of the national, 
provincial, and municipal governments. The British Ambassador in Havana estimated that 
Prio himself stole $90 million in public funds.”).   
 105.  GOTT, supra note 100, at 146.  
 106.  See id. When Batista learned that the nation’s military officers were planning to stage 
a coup regardless of Batista’s participation, he decided to place himself at the helm of the 
military’s efforts. Id.  
 107.  Id.; CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 32 (“When Batista led a second coup in 1952, there 
was little organized opposition.”).  
 108.  Richard Cavendish, General Batista Returns to Power in Cuba, HISTORY TODAY, 
March 2002, http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/general-batista-returns-power-
cuba.  
 109.  PATERSON, supra note 103, at 26–27; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY, supra note 
100, at 62; GOTT, supra note 100, at 146 (“After a perfunctory attempt to preserve the 
constitutional niceties, and to repeat his experience of the 1930s by finding a figleaf president, 
Batista appointed himself as chief of state . . . Much of the [C]onstitution of 1940 was 
suspended, but most people . . . gave the new government the benefit of the doubt.”). Among 
Batista’s changes were a series of strict restrictions upon speech and expression, including a 
provision that allowed him to unilaterally suspend freedom of the press, speech, and assembly 
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handed tactics discouraged all potential opponents.110  Ultimately, he 
ran unopposed.111  To many Cubans, the values of liberty and 
democratization in which they had taken such pride were now 
obscured by a government that was an international embarrassment.112 
This deeply felt discontent set the stage for a new face to abruptly 
arise on Cuba’s political landscape: a young lawyer named Fidel 
Castro.113 Beginning with a poorly planned, virtually suicidal attack on 
the army barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, Castro 
dominated the opposition movement against Batista’s dictatorship.114 
His rhetoric initially focused on restoring to Cuban citizens the 
freedoms that the Constitution of 1940 had guaranteed, the very 
liberties that Batista had eliminated.115  
In short order, Castro was prosecuted for his role in the army 
barracks attacks and exiled to Mexico.116 For the next two years, he 
stimulated support among individuals willing to engage in armed 
rebellion against the Batista government.117 Plans in place, his 
supporters launched a series of guerrilla attacks throughout the nation, 
maneuvers that received substantial support from an underground 
press that glorified the fighters’ actions.118 As the revolutionaries 
 
at any time for a forty-five-day period. STATEN, supra note 94, at 80.  
 110.  See JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 124 (2009).   
 111.  Id. Four years later, the Cuban presidential elections featured two candidates 
opposing Batista, but the elections were an obvious farce that unsurprisingly returned Batista 
to power by a wide margin of victory. Id.   
 112.  See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY, supra note 100, at 62.   
 113.  See MAURICE HALPERIN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF FIDEL CASTRO: AN ESSAY IN 
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 13 (1972).   
 114.   HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 9; CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 36–38; Bryan Logan, 
How Fidel Castro Rose to Power and Ruled Cuba for 5 Decades, BUSINESS INSIDER, Jan. 13, 
2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/fidel-castros-life-and-rise-to-power-2015-1.   
 115.  One of Castro’s primary messages in his now-legendary “History Will Absolve Me” 
speech in October 1953, delivered from prison after his arrest for leading the revolt against the 
army barracks, focused on reinstating the Constitution of 1940. See Rudo Kemper, Cuban 
Memories: The Cuban Constitution of 1940, Then and Today, U. MIAMI CUBAN HERITAGE 
COLLECTION, Oct. 14, 2010, http://library.miami.edu/chc/2010/10/14/cuban-memories-the-
cuban-constitution-of-1940-then-and-today/.  
 116.  CELESTINO HERES, UNPARDONABLE CRIMES—THE LEGACY OF FIDEL CASTRO: 
UNTOLD TALES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 67 (2003).  
 117.  KATIE MARSICO, FIDEL CASTRO: CUBAN PRESIDENT AND REVOLUTIONARY 36–38 
(2010). Playing upon the notion that his July 26 attack on the army barracks was justified, 
Castro began calling his cause “the July 26 Movement.” JULIA SWEIG, INSIDE THE CUBAN 
REVOLUTION: FIDEL CASTRO AND THE URBAN UNDERGROUND 6 (2009).   
 118.  TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY, GUERRILLAS AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSURGENTS AND REGIMES SINCE 1956 16, 31–33, 174–78 (1992); 
SWEIG, supra note 117, at 47. 
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gained traction, Batista hastily restored constitutional guarantees, even 
removing press censorship in all but one province, trying desperately 
to curry the people’s favor.119  
Yet Castro’s movement had gained too much support for the 
existing government to stop him now.  Ultimately, Batista was forced 
to abdicate his presidency.120  On New Year’s Day in 1959, Castro’s 
forces triumphantly claimed victory.121 The next morning, in a lengthy 
speech at Cospedes Park in Santiago de Cuba, Castro laid out his 
visions for Cuba.122  In doing so, he paid particular attention to the 
restoration of freedom of expression for all:  
Now anyone may speak out, whether they are for or against. 
Anyone who wishes to do so may speak out. That was not the case here 
previously because until the present time, [Batista’s followers] were 
the only ones [allowed] to speak out; only they spoke out. And they 
spoke against us. There will be freedom for those who speak in our 
favor and for those who speak against us and criticize us.123 
These promises appeared to call back the values of the 
Constitution of 1940, the freedoms in which so many Cubans had taken 
great satisfaction.124  All that remained to be answered was how Castro 
and his new government would put these vows into practice.   
E.  Tunisia and Egypt, 2011 
On December 17, 2010, a 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor 
named Mohammed Bouazizi stood outside a provincial government 
building, doused gasoline over his body, and set himself on fire.125 
Earlier that day, a police officer had confiscated his supposedly 
unlicensed pushcart and the produce that Bouazizi was trying to sell.126 
When Bouazizi offered to pay a fine, the officer allegedly slapped him, 
spat in his face, and insulted his family.127  Seeking to report the 
 
 119.  SWEIG, supra note 117, at 95–96.  
 120.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN DICTATORS: FROM NAPOLEON TO THE PRESENT 29 (2006).   
 121.  HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 17–18.  
 122.  FIDEL CASTRO READER 107 (David Deutschmann & Deborah Shnookal, eds., 2008). 
 123.  Id. at 129.  
 124.  See supra notes 94–98and accompanying text.  
 125.  Rania Abouzeid, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, TIME, 
(Jan. 21, 2011), www.content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html. 
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id.; see also Marc Fisher, In Tunisia, Acts of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of 
Revolution Through Arab World, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2011), 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-
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mistreatment, Bouazizi went to the provincial headquarters, only to 
find that the governmental officials had no interest in hearing his 
story.128 Less than an hour later, he lit the flame that severely burned 
his body and led to his eventual death—and ignited a series of 
revolutions now known as the “Arab Spring” throughout North Africa 
and the Middle East.129  
Bouazizi never set out to become a political martyr.130  
Nevertheless, his suicide proved to be the tipping point for several 
states whose citizens had long lived under autocratic regimes.131  Zine 
al-Abidine Ben Ali had ruled Tunisia since 1987.132  In Egypt, Hosni 
Mubarak had maintained power for an even longer period of time, 
enjoying a three-decade tenure in office.133  Both of these leaders 
openly denied freedom of expression to their citizens, silencing 
opponents with harsh tactics.134  Additionally, Mubarak and Ben Ali—
along with other dictatorial leaders within this region—exploited 
claims that they were “protecting” their constituents from outside 
“threats” to establish domineering security regimes, impose 
“emergency” laws that remained in effect for decades, and other tactics 
designed to stifle any form of dissent.135 In 2009, the United States 
ambassador to Tunisia sent a diplomatic cablegram stating: “Tunisia is 
a police state, with little freedom of expression or association, and 
 
revoltuion-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsuB_story.html.  
 128.  Fisher, supra note 127; Abouzeid, supra note 125.  
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Uprising, CNN (Mar. 22, 2011), 
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 131.  Allia Calkins, A Rude Awakening: Free Speech and the Arab Spring, VAND. POL. 
REV., Oct. 13, 2013,  http://www.vanderbiltpoliticalreview.com/a-rude-awakening-free-
speech-and-the-arab-spring.html (“This seemingly innocuous act set off a chain reaction that 
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 132.  Profile: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, BBC, June 20, 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-
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71 (Sylvester Bongani Maphosa, Laura DeLuca & Alphonse Keasley, eds., 2014) Nada 
Mrabet, How Censorship Stifled Us in Tunisia, TUNIS TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, 
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POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW 3/16/2017  3:03 PM 
126 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:107 
 
serious human rights problems.”136 The same description would 
accurately depict Egypt during this time period as well.137        
In a sense, the Arab Spring uprisings marked the first revolutions 
where the participants sought to break this culture of censorship by 
turning not only to the streets and public squares and traditional media 
sources, but also to the Internet.138  Blogs, Facebook pages, Twitter 
feeds, online forums, and other forms of social media became havens 
for activists to protest existing methods of governance, make plans for 
large-scale public demonstrations, and discuss the values that they 
wanted a new government to achieve.139  For example, it was a blogger 
who first uploaded to Facebook the video of Bouazizi setting himself 
on fire, leading to its widespread sharing on the Internet and, before 
long, mainstream media outlets.140  Similarly, the initial mass protest 
in Egypt was advertised anonymously on Facebook, bringing together 
tens of thousands of people to protest Mubarak’s dictatorship.141 
Governmental attempts to remove online material criticizing the 
current regimes only increased the revolutionaries’ efforts to restore 
this information to the Internet.142  
In Tunisia and Egypt, these calls for legally protected freedom of 
expression appeared to be particularly strong. “We were silent before,” 
one Tunisian citizen stated after Bouazizi’s death, “but Mohammed 
showed us that we must react.”143 Broadly written statutes prohibiting 
 
 136.  See Amy Davidson, Tunisia and Wikileaks NEW YORKER, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/tunisia-and-wikileaks.  
 137.  CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, AND CITIZEN JOURNALISM 2002 (2013); CASO, supra note 134, 
at 81–84. 
 138.  For just a sampling of the recent literature on this topic, see ANDREW PETERSON & 
PAUL WARWICK, GLOBAL LEARNING AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION 66–68 (2014); 
PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., OPENING CLOSED REGIMES: WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
DURING THE ARAB SPRING (2011), http://pitpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/2011_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-Mari-Mazaid_pITPI.pdf; 
Tim Eaton, Internet Activism and the Egyptian Uprisings: Transforming Online Dissent Into 
the Offline World, 9 WESTMINSTER PAPERS IN COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE 3 (2013), 
https://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/220675/WPCC-vol9-issue2.pdf. 
 139.  See note 138, supra. In fact, even before the Arab Spring revolutions occurred, active 
bloggers in Egypt and Tunisia were adamantly advocating for governmental reform. HOWARD 
ET AL., supra note 138, at 6.   
 140.  MUHAMAD OLIMAT, ARAB SPRING AND ARAB WOMEN 10 (2013).  
 141.  Jose Antonio Vargas, Spring Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on 
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-revolution-began-on-
facebook.html; Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, 
WIRED, Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011/02/egypts-revolutionary-fire.  
 142.  See HOWARD ET AL., supra note 138, at 7–17.   
 143.  Abouzeid, supra note 125.   
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vaguely defined classes of expression became particular enemies of the 
protestors. Article 98(f) of the Egyptian penal code, for instance, 
criminalized any communication that “exploits religion in order to 
promote extremist ideologies by word of mouth or in any other 
manner, with a view to stirring up sedition, disparaging or contempt of 
any divine religion or its adherents, or prejudicing national unity.”144 
Egyptian law also banned any expressions that “insulted” Egyptian 
public officials, foreign diplomats, or foreign heads of state.145 
Similarly, Tunisia possessed statutes such as Article 121.3 of their 
penal code, which allowed sentences of up to five years in prison for 
distributing or displaying any publications adjudged to “disturb public 
order or undermine public morality.”146  
In January 2011, Ben Ali announced that he would not seek re-
election when his latest term of office ended in 2014.147 He also 
delivered an unprecedented vow to remove censorship of the Internet 
and traditional media outlets, and to allow the unimpeded formation of 
opposing political parties.148  By this point, however, the people of 
Tunisia were in no mood for promises.149  Just a few days later, the 
still-rising tide of revolution forced Ben Ali to surrender his 
presidency.150  In Egypt, a similar pattern of events began later that 
month.151  After protests exploded in every major Egyptian 
municipality, Mubarak addressed the nation, promising to loosen 
restrictions on speech and expression, and guaranteeing other avenues 
 
 144.  Egypt: A Year of Attacks on Free Expression, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 11, 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/11/egypt-year-attacks-free-expression.  
 145.  Id.  
 146.  See Rory McCarthy, Who is Threatening Free Speech in Post-Revolutionary 
Tunisia?, FREE SPEECH DEBATE, Jan. 6, 2014, http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/who-is-
threatening-free-speech-in-post-revolutionary-tunisia/; Kerim Bouzouita, Tunisia’s Ground 
Zero for Creative Freedom, SEISMOPOLITE J. OF ART & POLITICS, October 2012, 
http://www.seismopolite.com/tunisias-ground-zero-for-creative-freedom.   
 147.  Yasmine Ryan, Tunisia President Not to Run Again, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 14, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/2011113192110570350.html.  
 148.  Id. (“Ben Ali promised broader political freedoms, including the formation of a 
political party and that all censorship of the internet and traditional media would be halted.”).  
 149.  See THE ARAB SPRING, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
RAMIFICATIONS 3 (Efraim Inbar, ed., 2013); SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION, AND 
CONTESTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 241 (Joel Beinin & Frederic Vairel, 
eds., 2011) (hereinafter SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION, AND CONTESTATION).  
 150.  Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced to Flee Tunisia as Protesters Claim Victory, THE 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-
flees-country-protests.  
 151.  David D. Kirkpatrick, Mubarak Orders Crackdown, With Revolt Sweeping Egypt, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/world/middleeast/29unrest.html?pagewanted=all.  
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of constitutional reform.152  As in Tunisia, however, the move was too 
little, too late.  On February 11, Mubarak resigned, and the Egyptian 
military took charge of the government.153 
Shortly after these overthrows, calls for greater freedoms in the 
speech and expression arenas emerged in both Tunisia and Egypt.154 
Among these vows were the remarks of Mohamed Morsi, the man 
whom the people of Egypt democratically elected as president, and 
Moncef Marzouki, eventually installed by Tunisia’s interim parliament 
as Ben Ali’s eventual successor.155 Both of these new leaders openly 
pledged their support to the freedoms of speech and expression, 
assembly, petition, and the like, stating that achieving stability in their 
nations began with the recognition of such liberties for all people.156  
Such sentiments echoed the strongly stated positions of many 
individuals who rallied to the revolutions.157  Now, the world would 
watch to see whether the promised broadening of these freedoms 
would actually occur. 
  
 
 152.  EDGAR THORPE, THE PEARSON GENERAL KNOWLEDGE MANUAL 2012 D.41 (2012); 
Griff Witte, Janine Zacharia & William Branigin, Mubarak Forces Government to Resign; 
Obama Urges Him to Deliver on Promises, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2011/01/25/AR2011012500866.html.  
 153.  David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html. 
At the outset, the Egyptian military promised to stand in solidarity with the protestors, 
understanding and meeting their demands for newfound freedoms. Id. However, this proved 
to be far from the case. See infra Part III.E..   
 154.  See, e.g., SONIA L. ALIANAK, THE TRANSITION TOWARDS REVOLUTION AND REFORM: 
THE ARAB SPRING REALISED? 52 (2014);MARWAN BISHARA, THE INVISIBLE ARAB: THE 
PROMISE AND PERIL OF THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS 78 (2013) (“Freedom of expression, freedom 
from fear, from want, from military intervention, and from war—those were their slogans from 
the very outset.”).  
 155.  See Gideon Rose, A Conversation with Moncef Marzouki, Council on Foreign 
Relations, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/tunisia/conversation-moncef-marzouki/p35325; 
Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi UN General Assembly Speech Transcript 2012, LATINO POST, Sept. 
26, 2012, http://www.latinospost.com/articles/4611/20120926/egypts-mohammed-morsi-un-
general-assembly-speech-mubarak-united-nations-transcript.htm.  
 156.  See id. However, Morsi’s commitment to freedom of expression was far more muted 
than Marzouki’s promises in this area. In his United Nations speech soon after his presidential 
inauguration, Morsi stated that while Egypt strongly supported freedom of expression, this 
expression did not extend to speech that insulted religions. See Paul Richter, In U.N. Speech, 
Egypt’s Morsi Rejects Broad Free Speech Rights, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/26/world/la-fg-un-morsi-20120927 
 157.  See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.  
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II.  FIRST OUT: IMMEDIATE POST-REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTAL 
ABRIDGEMENTS OF FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION      
A.  United States 
In 1798, President John Adams signed his name on a bill aimed 
at restricting speech and expression in the United States.158  Known as 
the “Sedition Act,” the new statute turned dissenting political opinions 
into criminal behavior.159  Evidence that an individual intended to 
oppose a government measure became proof enough to earn that 
individual a conviction.160  Less than a decade after declaring that 
“Congress shall make no law abridging” freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press, the fledgling federal government had enacted a 
measure accomplishing precisely what the First Amendment purported 
to prevent.161  
Multiple motivations inspired this law.  Arguably, the dominant 
factor focused on the young nation’s fear of impending war.162  In 1794, 
the United States entered into a controversial treaty with their recent 
enemy, Great Britain.163  In return for a series of diplomatic gains and 
the British agreement to vacate forts in North America’s western 
territories, the United States promised to grant Great Britain most 
favored nation trade status and agreed not to interfere in the ongoing 
war between Britain and France.164     
Both of these measures angered the government of France.165  In 
1796, the French retaliated by capturing American merchant ships and 
 
 158.  Rochelle Raneri Zuck, Alien and Sedition Acts, in THE MAKING OF A MODERN 
IMMIGRATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS 13 (Patrick J. Hayes, ed., 2012).  
 159.  See Douglas Bradburn, A Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 565 (July 2008) (describing the Sedition Act as “a new 
law to criminalize seditious writing, talk, and behavior”).  
 160.  Ch. 74, §2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).  
 161.  GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION 
ACT OF 1789 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 36 (2004) (“In this act, the Federalists [and the U.S. 
government] declared war on dissent.”).   
 162.  JAMES ROGERS SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW 
NATION IN CRISIS 163 (1995).  
 163.  TODD ESTES, THE JAY TREATY DEBATE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 104 (2006).   
 164.  See generally Jay Treaty, THE LEHRMAN INST., 
http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/jay-treaty.asp.  
 165.  THE SUPREME COURT: CONTROVERSIES, CASES, AND CHARACTERS FROM JOHN JAY TO 
JOHN ROBERTS 114 (Paul Finkleman, ed., 2014) (hereinafter “THE SUPREME COURT”) (“For 
the French, the ratification of Jay’s Treaty was a slap in the face. After all, many Frenchmen 
believed that the United States owed its very existence to French help.”).   
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seizing their cargo.166  Quickly, Adams ordered three American 
diplomats to meet with the French Foreign Minister, the Marquis de 
Talleyrand, and negotiate an agreement that ended this practice.167 
When the envoys arrived on French soil, however, they received word 
from Talleyrand’s intermediaries that the French would stop seizing 
American ships only if the United States provided France a low-
interest loan, paid American merchant claims against France, and 
provided Talleyrand with a bribe of fifty thousand pounds.168 
The American diplomats flatly rejected this proposal.169 After this 
refusal, and the refutation of a second similar French offer, Talleyrand 
threatened to invade the United States.170 When diplomatic dispatches 
describing this threat arrived in Washington, Adams began preparing 
the nation for war with France.171  Rumors about the likelihood of 
hostilities ran rampant, with “public pronouncements couched in 
extreme terms” igniting sentiments about how the United States should 
deal with the alleged menace overseas.172  Jonathan Dayton, the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, went as far as announcing 
that a vast military force had gathered in France, preparing to launch 
an offensive on United States soil—a claim that was completely 
false.173        
Against this combustible backdrop, the United States Congress 
passed four related laws during a one-month period in 1798.174  Three 
of these statutes focused on foreigners coming to the United States, 
increasing the term of residency required to attain American 
 
 166.  MATTHEW Q. DAWSON, PARTISANSHIP AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICA’S SECOND PARTY, 
1796–1800 52 (2000).  
 167.  Gregg Costa, John Marshall, The Sedition Act, and Free Speech in the Early 
Republic, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1021–23 (1999).  
 168.  Id. at 1022.   
 169.  Id. In response to the requested bribe for Talleyrand, American diplomat Charles 
Pinckney responded, “No, no; not a sixpence.” STONE, supra note 161, at 22.   
 170.  ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, SUICIDE PACT: THE RADICAL EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWERS AND THE ASSAULT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES 32 (2014).  
 171.  See id. at 32–33; STONE, supra note 161, at 22–25 
 172.  See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WARS OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1783-1812 
554 (Spencer C. Tucker, ed., 2014); RICHARD J. ELLIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY 203 (2013); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 240–47 (2009); ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND RED MONDAY 14 (1999); ANDREW SANTELLA, JOHN ADAMS 29–30 (2002); 
ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED 
WAR WITH FRANCE 82–84 (1966); Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 215, 215–17 (2003) (hereinafter Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime).  
 173.  WOOD, supra note 172, at 245. 
 174.  See generally Zuck, supra note 158.  
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citizenship and empowering the President of the United States to arrest 
any foreigner who was a citizen of an enemy nation and deport any 
alien deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States” 
during peacetime.175 The fourth law in this group was the Sedition Act, 
declaring that any expression aimed at “opposing or resisting any law 
of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States,” 
and publishing “any false, scandalous, and malicious writing” 
criticizing the American government were high misdemeanor 
offenses.176 Anyone found guilty of expressing their views about the 
United States government in these prohibited manners could receive 
steep fines or prison sentences.177          
The four Alien and Sedition Acts passed despite stiff 
opposition.178  Representative Edward Livingston specifically 
denounced the Sedition Act as a reactionary, fear-driven reduction of 
fundamental liberties.179  “No evidence [of American citizens 
attempting to undermine the federal government and side with France], 
then, being produced, we have a right to say that none exists, and yet 
we are about to sanction a most important act, and on what ground?” 
he demanded of his fellow legislators in one oration. “Our individual 
suspicions, our private fears, our overheated imaginations.”180  Others 
joined him in these objections.181  
Even Adams himself questioned these measures, particularly the 
Sedition Act, although he did not openly oppose them.182  Yet anti-
French feelings had reached a zenith, and the majority of the people 
did not want to hear their president talk about diplomacy with the 
 
 175.  See Marshall Smelser, George Washington and the Alien and Sedition Acts, 59 AM. 
HIST. REV. 322, 322 (1954); STONE, supra note 161, at 33.   
 176.  Ch. 74, §1, §2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).  
 177.  Ch. 74, §2, §3, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 178.  See, e.g., Bradburn, supra note 159, at 565.  
 179.  See RONALD H. BAYOR, THE COLUMBIA DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RACE AND 
ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 177–79 (2004).  
 180.  Id. at 178.  
 181.  For instance, Albert Gallatin declared:  
This [Sedition Bill] and its supporters suppose that whoever dislikes the 
measures of the Administration and of a temporary majority in [C]ongress, and 
shall, either by speaking or writing, expresses his disapprobation and his want of 
confidence in men now in power, is seditious, is an enemy, not of Administration, 
but of the Constitution, and is liable to punishment.  
JAMES ROGERS SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN 
CRISIS 163 (1995); see also WOOD, supra note 172, at 245.  
 182.  See Laura Long, An Analysis of Congressional Arguments Limiting Free Speech, 52 
COMMUNICATION L. REV. 52, 52 (2013).   
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“enemy.”183  Fearing that the American people would revolt against the 
government, he signed the bills into law, rationalizing them as “war 
measures” to ensure the citizenry’s safety.184      
Yet another plausible explanation existed for the passage of these 
laws. Adams was a member of the Federalist Party, the dominant 
political party in Congress and on the United States Supreme Court at 
that time.185  Thomas Jefferson, the Vice-President, belonged to the 
Democratic-Republican Party, which formed a significant minority in 
Congress.186  The parties had engaged in an increasingly hostile 
relationship with one another.187  Since the Federalists generally 
believed that immigrants would typically vote with the Democratic-
Republicans, the three laws limiting the influence of aliens benefited 
Federalist interests.188  Likewise, the power implicit within the Sedition 
Act could allow the Federalist majority to censure Democratic-
Republican newspapers and speechmakers, thus controlling the 
messages that the public heard leading up to the elections of 1800.189  
The first arrest under the Sedition Act came on July 17, 1798, 
shortly after the law’s passage.190  William Durrell, editor of a 
Democratic-Republican newspaper in upstate New York, was indicted 
for publishing “false scandalous malicious and [defamatory] Libel of 
and concerning John Adams” and later convicted of seditious libel.191  
Not long afterward, Benjamin Franklin Bache, editor of the 
Philadelphia Aurora and the grandson of Benjamin Franklin, became 
a target of Federalist “committees of surveillance.”192  Eventually, they 
 
 183. See Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, supra note 172, at 217. 
 184.  See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 505–06 (2008). In addition, Adams adopted 
the Blackstone-esque approach that the Sedition Act was acceptable because it did not involve 
a prior restraint on speech. RICHARD L. WILSON, AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS 7 (2002).  
 185.  See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 
to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 274 (1986).   
 186.  Craig R. Smith, The Aliens are Coming: John Adams and the Federalist Attack on 
the First Amendment, CTR. FOR FIRST AMENDMENT STUDIES, 
http://www.firstamendmentstudies.org/wp/alien.html. 
 187.  See David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel 
into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 159 (2001). 
 188.  Smith, supra note 186; Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, supra note 172, at 217.  
 189.  See Gibson, supra note 185, at 273. In the words of Professor Geoffrey Stone: 
“Suppressing speech because it is dangerous to the national interest is one thing; suppressing 
it because it threatens a partisan interest is something else entirely. As the events of 1798 
demonstrate, it is often difficult to tell the difference.” STONE, supra note 161, at 75.   
 190.  RICHARD N. ROSENFIELD, AMERICAN AURORA: A DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN 
RETURNS 690 (2014).  
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id.; see also Ronald K. L. Collins, Benjamin Bache and the Fight for a Free Press, 
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found what they wanted to uncover, leading to Bache’s arrest for 
“libelling the President and Executive Government, in a manner 
tending to excite sedition, and opposition to the laws, by sundry 
publications and republications.”193  Only Bache’s  death from yellow 
fever prevented him from being forced to defend himself from this 
accusation at a criminal trial.194         
By the time the Sedition Act expired on March 3, 1801, a reported 
twenty-five Americans had been arrested for seditious conduct.195  
Fourteen individuals had been indicted on criminal charges under this 
law.196  Ten of the indictments led to a criminal trial, all of them ending 
in convictions.197  The forms of the purported “sedition” ranged from a 
Massachusetts man putting up a liberty pole calling for “downfall to 
the Tyrants of America” to a New Jersey man shouting out a drunken 
comment against Adams’s administration.198    
Still, from a free speech perspective, a silver lining eventually 
emerged from this situation.  With every arrest under the Sedition Act, 
the public opposition to the Federalists grew, especially as the 
anticipated war with France never materialized.199  People grew 
disenchanted with the notion of the one party maintaining control of 
all three federal government branches, recognizing that the lack of 
opposition in power made it too easy for the political leaders to ignore 
the individual rights of citizens.200  In sum, the fervor of nationalism 
 
FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., July 14, 2008, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/benjamin-
bache-the-fight-for-a-free-press; Gordon T. Belt, The Sedition Act of 1798, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CTR., at 2, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/Sedition_Act_cases.pdf.  
 193.  ROSENFIELD, supra note 190, at 169.  
 194.  Belt, supra note 192, at 2.  
 195.  WOOD, supra note 172, at 260.  
 196.  Id.  
 197.  Id. This included prosecutions of four of the five most influential Republican 
journalistic publications. STONE, supra note 161, at 48, 63; Stone Civil Liberties in Wartime, 
supra note 172, at 217 (“[T]he Sedition Act was vigorously enforced, but only against 
supporters of the Republican party.”).  
 198.  See SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET: FESTIVE CULTURE 
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 176 (2010); Bradburn, supra note 159, at 578 
 199.  See, e.g., FRANK N, MAGILL, THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES: DICTIONARY OF WORLD 
BIOGRAPHY, VOL. IV 19 (2013); Jeffrey L. Pasley, Alien and Sedition Acts, in CONSPIRACY 
THEORIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 54 (Peter Knight, ed., 2003); Gary D. 
Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian 
Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 939–41 
(1992).   
 200.  See JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
PARTIES 46–47 (2000); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a 
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 123–24 (1984) (“This act could have hardly 
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and fears about safety from harm that swept the country at the outset 
of the “quasi-war” with France dissolved relatively quickly, replaced 
by what seemed to be a renewed interest in preserving personal 
liberties.201    
Reading these tea leaves of public opinion, Jefferson and the 
Democratic-Republicans made governmental respect for freedom of 
expression and other civil liberties a central plank in their campaigns 
for the elections in 1800.202  After a bitterly contested fight for the 
White House, Jefferson emerged victorious, and the Democratic-
Republicans succeeded in winning a majority of congressional seats as 
well.203  When the Sedition Act expired, Congress refused to renew 
it.204  Jefferson pardoned individuals who were convicted under that 
law, and ceased virtually all pending Sedition Act prosecutions.205  The 
House of Representatives even went as far as impeaching Justice 
Samuel Chase, a Federalist who had advocated for the Sedition Act’s 
passage and used it zealously from the bench.206  
Of course, just as the Sedition Act’s passage owed much to the 
Federalist Party’s political strategies, the subsequent hasty recoil from 
this law’s restrictions almost certainly arose from the Democratic-
Republican Party’s efforts to curry favor from voters.207 Still, the fact 
remains that despite their stark immediate post-revolutionary retreat 
away from defending free speech and expression, the United States 
succeeded in reversing course surprisingly quickly.208 This shift created 
 
been a starker instance of self-serving politics . . . . [U]ndoubtedly, this Federalist talk of 
internal enemies was not more than poor camouflage for a measure favoring incumbency.”); 
MAGILL, supra note 199, at 19.  
 201.  See STONE, supra note 161, at 71 (“The net effect of the act had been to ‘stir up a nest 
of hornets.’”). 
 202.  See e.g., SUSAN DUNN, JEFFERSON’S SECOND REVOLUTION: THE ELECTION OF 1800 
AND THE TRIUMPH OF REPUBLICANISM 145 (2004). 
 203.  SMITH, supra note 186. In addition to Jefferson’s presidential victory, the 
Democratic-Republicans came away controlling 103 seats in the House of Representatives and 
twenty-five seats in the Senate, compared to just thirty-nine Federalist seats in the House and 
nine seats in the Senate. Id. at n.40.  
 204.  Gibson, supra note 185, at 275. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id.; BAILEY STONE, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION REVISITED: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE AND RUSSIA 200, 209, 221 (2013). 
 207.  See e.g., John Lauritz Larson, Jefferson’s Union and the Problem of Internal 
Improvements, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 353 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993); DUNN, supra note 
202, at 145. 
 208.  See supra notes 199–207 and accompanying text,; see also Burt Neuborne, The Role 
of Courts in Time of War, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 570 (2005) (“The Alien 
and Sedition Acts were repudiated at the polls in the election of 1800.”). 
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a considerably stronger climate of preserving these freedoms that 
remained largely unblemished in the United States until at least the 
American Civil War, an atmosphere that continues to be a significant 
presence in American political debates today.209      
B.  France 
Despite the ferocious nationwide violence that erupted after the 
storming of the Bastille, the French monarchy remained in power after 
the initial struggles of the French Revolution.210 Overall, the 
revolutionaries seemed to accept the new National Assembly, along 
with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, as signals 
that the government would meet their demands.211  Yet the 
revolutionary leaders also desired a written constitution, a single 
document that clearly articulated the rights of French citizens.212  
Indeed, a Constitutional Committee with representatives from the three 
estates had existed in various forms since the day that the Bastille fell 
to the people.213  
By the autumn of 1791, this Committee had approved a written 
constitution that would govern the post-revolutionary nation.214  
Reluctantly, King Louis XVI agreed to recognize it and abide by its 
terms, drastically reducing the monarch’s authority over the French 
people.215  The drafters incorporated the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen into the preamble of the document, reaffirming 
the revolutionary fervor for guaranteeing freedom of speech and 
 
 209.  See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 185, at 271–72, 276; STONE, supra note 161, at 73–76. 
The issues that the Sedition Act raised throughout the young United States remain a fertile 
source for discussion and debate in the twenty-first century United States, particularly after 
the federal measures that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For a sampling 
of some recent works on the same basic issues that surrounded the Sedition Act debates, see 
generally, SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 
(2011); OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (2009); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, 
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2006).  
 210.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 65–67, 276. 
 211.  See supra Part I.B. 
 212.  See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 156.   
 213.  See generally MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS, THE REMAKING OF FRANCE: THE NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791 50 (2002). 
 214.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 156–58. This marked 
the first written constitution ever to govern France. See HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at 212.  
 215.  MARGARET R. O’LEARY, FORGING FREEDOM: THE LIFE OF CERF BERR OF 
MEDELSHEIM 318–20 (2012). 
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expression, petition, assembly, and other individual liberties.216  
Separation of powers among the National Assembly, the king and his 
court, and the judiciary formed the backbone of the new governmental 
plan.217  The old feudal system and the ancient traditions of the 
monarchy had little place within this constitution’s framework.218   
Still, the document contained some surprises.  The constitution 
drew a division between “active citizens”—the nation’s more affluent 
property-holders—and the financially poorer “passive citizens.”219  All 
women in France were classified as “passive citizens.”220  Only 
individuals whose tax payments surpassed a certain threshold were 
permitted to vote in elections.221  These restrictions hearkened back to 
some of the old regime’s policies, angering revolutionaries who 
wanted the freedoms on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen to apply to all people, regardless of their financial wealth.222      
Complicating matters further, France engaged in a war against 
Austria in the spring of 1792.223  Amid this chaos, new political factions 
formed and sought to achieve popularity among the people.224  Finding 
the greatest success was the Jacobin Club, the most radical and 
egalitarian-minded political organization in France at that time.225  Any 
club member who ever spoke against any principle of the Declaration 
 
 216.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 156. 
 217.  See Mary Denis O’Grady, Master’s Thesis, The Theory of Separation of Powers as 
Expressed in the French Constitution if 1791, Paper 795 (1948), 
http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1797&context=luc_theses; see also 
Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1989)(quoting the 
Declaration: “‘any society in which rights are not guaranteed, or in which the separation of 
powers is not defined, has no constitution[.]’”) (“French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen, art. 16.”). 
 218.  However, the new constitution did define the king as a representative of the nation, 
even though the king was never elected by the people and thus had no direct legitimacy to the 
citizenry. HOWARD G. BROWN, WAR, REVOLUTION, AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE: POLITICS 
AND ARMY ADMINISTRATION IN FRANCE, 1791-1799 16 (1995).   
 219.  JAMES R. LEHNING, TO BE A CITIZEN: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE EARLY FRENCH 
THIRD REPUBLIC 23 (2001); Giovanna Procacci, Poor Citizens: Social Citizenship Versus 
Individualization of Welfare, in CITIZENSHIP, MARKETS, AND THE STATE 52 (Colin Crouch et 
al. eds., 2001). 
 220.  MIM KELBER, WOMEN AND GOVERNMENT: NEW WAYS TO POLITICAL POWER (1994). 
 221.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 158. 
 222.  See, e.g., C. J. MITCHELL, THE FRENCH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF 1791 111 (1988). 
 223.  CHARLES ESDAILE, THE FRENCH WARS 1792–1815 4 (2002).  
 224.  See generally Alison Patrick, Political Divisions in the French National Convention, 
1792-93, 41 J. MODERN HIST. 421–74 (1969) (describing the increasingly strident breaks 
among emerging political factions during this time period in France). 
 225.  For a good summary of the Jacobin Club and its influence over the French citizenry, 
see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 361–66. 
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of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was instantly expelled from 
the organization.226  Ironically, the group that spoke so highly about 
equal rights and freedoms for all routinely persecuted its own members 
for speech and expression that did not advance the Jacobin Club’s 
gains.227                
In August 1792, the revolutionaries arrested Louis XVI and his 
queen, Marie Antoinette.228  In September, the National Convention 
(which replaced the National Assembly as France’s new legislative 
organ) voted to abolish the monarchy entirely, proclaiming “the new 
France” to be a republic.229  Four months after that, Louis XVI was 
tried by the National Convention for treason and condemned to 
death.230  That autumn, Queen Marie Antoinette died on the guillotine 
as well.231  
The removal of the monarchy created a power vacuum atop the 
French government’s food chain.232  To avoid total bedlam, the 
National Convention established a twelve-member Committee of 
Public Safety, placing almost total control in their hands.233  At first, 
the Committee seemed to focus on preserving and enlarging the rights 
of the French citizenry, drafting a new written constitution that 
incorporated and enlarged the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen in June 1793.  Leaders of the National Convention insisted 
that the people themselves would retain the right to vote for or against 
 
 226.  Id. at 363–64. 
 227.  PATRICE L. R. HIGONNET, GOODNESS BEYOND VIRTUE, JACOBINS DURING THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 70 (1998). 
 228.  CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 30. 
 229. A COMPANION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 43, at 447–48.The National 
Convention emerged during the upheaval of August 1792 with three stated purposes: 
temporarily governing France, deciding the fate of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and 
drafting a new constitution in which a bona fide republic would replace the constitutional 
monarchy that exited under the current constitutional structure. Id. at 448.  
 230.  Joel Felix, Monarchy, in HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at 
56. 
 231.  CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 38. Many French citizens, however, were displeased by 
the executions of the king and queen, arguing that the revolutionary leaders should have 
reached a more moderate solution while still ensuring freedom for the people. See, e.g., 
WALTON, supra note 45, at 130.  
 232.  Under the Constitution of 1791, the king served as the center of the government’s 
executive branch. See BROWN, supra note 218, at 16. With the king gone and the monarchy 
abolished completely, the center of power in the French government was abruptly vacant, with 
no immediate legal plan of succession in place.  
 233.  See generally R.R. PALMER, TWELVE WHO RULED: THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY DURING THE TERROR (1941) (describing the creation of the Committee of Public Safety 
and its rapid ascent to a position of absolute power in France).  
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this proposed plan of government, giving the people a level of power 
that they had not held in the formation of the previous constitution.234  
Political participation among the populace swelled to unprecedented 
levels, with an overwhelming majority of citizens voting in favor of 
enacting the Constitution of 1793.235     
Just a few months later, however, the Committee of Public Safety 
declared that the new constitution would be suspended indefinitely, as 
France was still in an emergency situation of revolution.236  Leading 
the Committee at the time of this decision was Maximilien 
Robespierre, one of the staunchest radicals of the Jacobin Club.237  A 
devoted reader of Rousseau’s philosophical treatises, Robespierre was 
a lawyer who joined the revolutionary effort as a man who 
sympathized with the poor and opposed the death penalty.238  He 
became president of the Jacobin faction in 1790, serving as a drafter of 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.239  Evidently, 
he also reversed his stance on the death penalty, vigorously speaking 
out in favor of Louis XVI’s execution.240           
With Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety in charge, 
freedom of expression became virtually non-existent in France.241  
Without strictly limiting speech and expression to prevent subversive 
or immoral commentary, Robespierre believed that the French 
government could never again maintain any semblance of authority 
over the general public.242  The people were desperate, he argued, 
leaving no choice but to use desperate measures to gain control.243 
 
 234.  See id. 
 235.  Id.  
 236.  Id. (“The government of the Republic will be revolutionary until the peace.”); see 
also MICHAEL L. KENNEDY, THE JACOBIN CLUBS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1793–1795 53 
(2000).   
 237.  See KENNEDY, supra note 236, at 54. 
 238.  PALMER, supra note 233, at 6–7. 
 239.  Maximilien Robespierre: 1758-1794, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/robespierre_maximilien.shtml (last visited 
March 26, 2016). 
 240.  Id.  
 241.  See, e.g., WALTON, supra note 45, at 129. 
 242.  See, e.g., LYNN AVERY HUNT, POLITICS, CULTURE AND CLASS IN THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 46 (1984) (“The Terror was an emanation of virtue for Robespierre and the other 
radicals, because it was required for the security of the new republic.”).  
 243.  Id. This seemed to be a tremendous ideological reversal for Robespierre, who had 
declared his devotion to governance by the popular will during discussions regarding the 
Constitution of 1793, requesting a meeting place large enough to hold twelve thousand 
spectators to ensure that “the general will, the voice of reason, and the public interest [would] 
be heard.” Id. at 85. 
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Seizing upon the fact that France historically recognized a crime of 
calumny, or injurious speech, Robespierre oversaw enactment and 
enforcement of new statutes punishing individuals for forms of speech 
and expression that the Committee considered “treachery.”244  Perhaps 
the most restrictive of all of them was The Law of Suspects, which 
imposed penalties upon any people who, “by their conduct or their 
relationships, by their conversation or by their writing, [were] shown 
to be partisans of tyranny and federalism and the enemies of 
freedom.”245      
Between 1793 and 1794, tens of thousands of French citizens 
were executed on the guillotine or died in prison for their allegedly 
disloyal remarks, writings, or other expressions and actions, judged 
with impunity by the Committee of Public Safety.246 Today, historians 
refer to this gruesome period as the Reign of Terror.247 Interestingly, 
though, Robespierre was not completely callous about what he and his 
followers were doing.248 At least once, he even said that post-
revolutionary leaders should try to extend rights of free expression 
rather than chilling this freedom.249  Yet he viewed the use of terror 
against people believed to harbour anti-government sentiments as 
grisly means of accomplishing a virtuous end.250 “It has been said that 
terror is the principle of despotic government,” he told the National 
Convention. “Does your government therefore resemble despotism? 
Yes, as the sword that gleams in the hands of the heroes of liberty 
resembles that with which the henchmen of tyranny are armed.”251 
According to his professed beliefs, being a heavy-handed censor, 
inquisitor, and punisher now would ultimately lead to the forging a far 
 
 244.  WALTON, supra note 45, at 133. 
 245.  IAN DONNACHIE & CARMEN LAVIN, FROM ENLIGHTENMENT TO ROMANTICISM, 
ANTHOLOGY I 93 (2003); WALTON, supra note 45, at 133–34. 
 246.  RICHARD BULLIET ET AL., THE EARTH AND ITS PEOPLES: A GLOBAL HISTORY 491 (5th 
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twelve Committee members wielded over France at this time, see PALMER, supra note 233, at 
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 247.  RICHARD BULLIET ET AL, supra note 246, at 491. 
 248.  See DONNACHIE & LAVIN, supra note 245, at 98; see e.g., WALTON, supra note 45, at 
135. 
 249.  WALTON, supra note 45, at 135 (“As Robespierre admitted in May 1791, revolutions 
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 250.  See, e.g., HUNT, supra note 242, at 46. 
 251.  CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 39. 
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more stable society.252   
In the end, the man who ordered so many executions on the basis 
of mere suspicions ultimately found himself at the receiving end of 
such treatment.253  After living the last year of his life wrapped in 
paranoia, rarely even leaving his house, was arrested and executed by 
guillotine in the summer of 1794.254  
Still, the effects of the Reign of Terror on the population 
lingered.255  Within a five-year period, France had changed from a 
revolutionary society that seemed committed to permitting freedom of 
expression and other individual right to a land of suppression, 
suspicion, violence, and fear.256  It would take some time for this deeply 
rooted atmosphere to begin shifting to the far more favorable free 
expression climate that exists in France in the present day.257        
C.  Russia 
When Czar Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto, much of the 
Russian population erupted in celebration.258  Their revolutionary 
movement had not succeeded in toppling the existing regime, but many 
of the individuals calling for change at that time were looking for 
systemic reform, not full removal of the czar.259  Achieving the 
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 258.  See supra Part I.C. 
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promises within the October Manifesto appeared to encapsulate 
enough victories to satisfy them.260  To these revelers, this day 
represented a pivot point in their lives, the moment when they began 
to gain some bona fide control over their social, economic, and 
political destinies.261    
Yet some people remained skeptical about the prospects for 
change.  “Does [the czar] promise [any reforms] of his own good will? 
Or with a pure heart?” asked Marxist theorist Leon Trotsky rhetorically 
during an address in 1905.  Later in his speech, Trotsky answered his 
own question: “It is this tireless hangman on the throne whom we have 
forced to promise us freedom.”262  
Ultimately, the fears of Trotsky and the other skeptics proved to 
be justified.  Despite his myriad of promises to improve civil liberties 
and economic opportunities for the citizenry, Nicholas II quickly felt 
“sick with shame at this betrayal of the dynasty.”263  It soon became 
apparent that the czar had no desire to relinquish his autocratic rule and 
grant more freedoms to the people.  Even on the day of the October 
Manifesto’s publication, the celebratory mood was tempered in many 
communities where police officers violently shut down peaceful 
meetings and protests.264  During the next three days, 690 documented 
instances of government-sponsored violence against Russian subjects 
occurred in 660 towns and villages across the empire.265  
Many Russian revolutionaries believed that the greatest 
opportunity for reform came from the Duma, the popularly elected 
legislature that Nicholas II promised in the October Manifesto.266  
Installing people who would represent the average citizen’s interests 
 
greater freedoms for his subjects. Petition Prepared for Presentation to Nicholas II, January 
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in this legislative body instilled hope of actually realizing the czar’s 
October Manifesto pledges of free speech, assembly, and multiple 
other individual liberties.267  When elections for seats in the Duma 
occurred without any notable government interference, this 
widespread level of anticipation rose even higher.268    
Before the Duma actually convened, however, Nicholas II 
promulgated the Fundamental Laws of Russia, a document that would 
serve as Russia’s new constitution.269  At first glance, the Fundamental 
Laws appeared to be largely the same as the October Manifesto.  It 
contained strong language guaranteeing freedom of speech and 
renouncing past practices of state-ordered censorship.270  It legalized 
political parties and trade unions, entities that received no legal 
protection from the Russian government before 1905.271  It recognized 
freedom of association and freedom of conscience for all Russian 
citizens.272 
Closer examination, however, revealed important contrasts 
between the October Manifesto and the Fundamental Laws. For 
instance, the Fundamental Laws granted the czar power to dissolve the 
Duma at any time, leaving the popularly elected legislature living in 
fear of the czar’s actions.273  No bill could become a law without the 
czar’s approving signature.274 During periods when the Duma was not 
in session, the czar had complete decision-making authority for 
Russia.275  The power to declare war or enter into a peace agreement 
rested unilaterally with the czar.276  Overall, the message was blunt. 
Russia had a popularly elected legislature now, but the czar was still 
 
 267.  See id. For a brief period after signing the October Manifesto, Czar Nicholas II and 
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the nation’s ultimate holder of power.277  “To obey [the czar’s] 
authority, not only through fear but for the sake of conscience, is 
ordered by God himself,” the new constitution proclaimed.278                 
When the Duma opened its first session in April 1906, reasons for 
optimism once more quickly vanished.279  The majority of its members 
called for a series of new measures: greater rights of expression and 
association for trade unions, the release of political prisoners, and land 
reform.280  Most notably of all, the Duma requested that the czar yield 
more power to the legislature, transforming Russia from an autocracy 
into a constitutional monarchy.281  Instead of agreeing to any of these 
reforms, however, Nicholas II decided to take the opposite approach. 
In July 1906, after the legislative body had remained in session for just 
forty-two days, the czar dissolved the Duma entirely.282        
In February 1907, the Second Duma convened.283  Once again, its 
members recommended passage of several reforms, and once again, 
Nicholas II dismissed the legislators.284  To avoid facing such 
recommendations again, Nicholas II used his power of ruling by decree 
when the Duma was out of session to enact new election laws that were 
drafted by his prime minister, Peter Stolypin.285  These provisions 
disenfranchised a sizeable portion of the Russian population, reserving 
the greatest number of votes for Russia’s richest landowners.286  
Consequently, the composition of the Third Duma and the Fourth 
Duma included considerably more conservative, pro-government 
members than the previous two Dumas.287  At the outset of World War 
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I, the Duma voted to officially support Nicholas II and his advisors, 
and to dissolve itself until the war’s end.288  Deputies who voted against 
the czar on this issue were subsequently arrested.289      
Stolypin held little regard for delivering on the promises of 
freedom of expression contained in the October Manifesto and, to a 
lesser extent, the Fundamental Laws.  Under his oversight, individuals 
who were suspected of speaking or writing against the czar could be 
imprisoned, exiled, or even killed.290  Between 1906 and 1909 alone, 
2,694 Russians were sentenced to death.291  
Surprisingly, the total number of newspapers in Russia actually 
increased slightly during this same time period, rising from 
approximately 602 Russian-language newspapers in 1908 to 972 
Russian-language newspapers by 1914.292  However, with the 
substantial powers derived from the Fundamental Laws at his 
disposal—including Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, a provision 
permitting the government to circumvent the legislature entirely in 
“emergency” situations—Stolypin wielded his authority to eradicate 
real and perceived dissenters.293 He justified such measures as 
necessary to prevent chaos and disorder.294  “[W]hen in danger, the 
state must revert to the most rigorous, the most exceptional measures 
in order to avoid disintegration,” Stolypin declared in one address to 
the Duma. “This was, this is, and this will be so always and 
everywhere. . . . [T]he government came to the conclusion that the 
country expects from it a demonstration not of weakness but of 
faith.”295      
Eventually, the various negative pressures of this era boiled over 
in another revolution. In October 1917, the Russian revolutionaries 
overthrew the czarist regime, and Vladimir Lenin seized full control of 
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 290.  See, e.g., HELEN RAPPAPORT, CONSPIRATOR: LENIN IN EXILE 144–45 (2012).  
 291.  Alexander N. Domrin, A Lost War on Terror: Forgotten Lessons of the Russian 
Empire, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 63, 86 (2010). In those three years, more Russians received a 
death sentence than were executed in the vast nation’s entire history. Id.  
 292.  WALTER G. MOSS, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA, VOLUME 2: SINCE 1855, at 125 (2005).  
 293.  See, e.g., Steven L. Hoch, Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and the Politics of 
Renewal in Russia by Peter Waldron, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 462, 462–63 (2000); PIPES, supra 
note 70, at 170.   
 294.  See PIPES, supra note 70, at 170 (“Because he believed in the rule of law, he regretted 
having to [govern by decree], but he saw no alternative: such procedures were ‘a deplorable 
necessity’ justified on the grounds that at times the interests of the state took precedence.”).  
 295.  Domrin, supra note 291, at 89.  
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the nation.296  His Communist ideals of a classless society where people 
took only what they needed and contributed according to their 
individual abilities appealed to a population that had spent too long 
stuck in poor economic conditions.297  Yet the notions of freedom of 
speech and expression seemed to be lost in the shuffle of this uprising.  
Such liberties were never part of Lenin’s message to the people.298  
“Everyone is free to write and say whatever he likes, without any 
restriction,” he stated.  “But every voluntary association (including the 
[Communist] Party) is also free to expel members who use the name 
of the Party to advocate anti-Party views.299    
Yet it was a different alleged comment that may have provided 
the most emblematic declaration of where freedom of speech and 
expression stood after Lenin assumed governance of Russia.  
“Freedom of speech?” he apparently asked incredulously soon after 
taking office.  “We are not going to commit suicide.”300   
D.  Cuba 
In 1959, Fidel Castro’s speech to the assembled masses at 
Cospedes Park instilled hope for restorations of traditional Cuban 
freedoms lost under the Batista dictatorship.301 In that address, Castro 
emphasized the importance of freedom of expression, stating that 
anyone—even critics of his government—could express their 
viewpoints publically at any time without fear of state-sponsored 
censure.302 The fact that Castro went to such lengths in this oration to 
discuss freedom of expression provided many Cubans with an 
overwhelming sense of hope that Castro would preserve the individual 
liberties described in the Constitution of 1940.303       
Just two years later, however, Castro addressed the Cuban people 
 
 296.  ROBERT SERVICE, A HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA 26 (2013) (“Lenin became the 
country’s ruler within months of tsarism’s overthrow.”).  
 297.  See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 261, at 123.  
 298.  At least as early as 1905, Lenin was advocating for complete Party regulation of 
literature, and total Party control over works of “science, philosophy, and aesthetics.” ERIKA 
GOTTLIEB, DYSTOPIAN FICTION EAST AND WEST: UNIVERSE OF TERROR AND TRIAl 121 (2001).  
 299.  V. I. LENIN: 10 COLLECTED WORKS 47 (Andrew Rothstein, trans. & ed., Moscow, 
Progress Publisher 2010) (1905), http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/Lenin%20CW-
Vol.%2010.pdf. 
 300.  Prominent Russians: Vladimir Lenin, RUSSIPEDIA, 
http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/leaders/vladimir-lenin/.  
 301.  See FIDEL CASTRO READER, supra note 122, at 107.   
 302.  See supra Part I.D.  
 303.  See supra note 115 and accompanying text.   
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with remarks that carried a far different message.  On its face, this 
speech was directed toward Cuba’s “intellectuals,” the artists and 
writers who demanded to know precisely how much dissent Castro 
would tolerate.304  Castro began this address by promising to 
safeguarding the liberty of all Cuban citizens and condemning the 
Batista government for failing to do so.305  About halfway through his 
remarks, however, the revolutionary leader began changing course, 
stating:  
The Revolution must understand that [not everyone in Cuba 
supports its aims], and consequently must act in such a way that the 
entire sector of artists and intellectuals who are not genuinely 
revolutionary find a place to work and to create within the Revolution, 
and so that their creative spirit will have an opportunity and freedom 
for expression within the Revolution, even though they are not 
revolutionary writers or artists. This means that within the Revolution, 
everything goes; against the Revolution, nothing. Nothing against the 
Revolution, because the Revolution has its rights also, and the first 
right of the Revolution is its right to exist, and no one can stand against 
the right of the Revolution to be and to exist . . . since it takes in the 
interests of the people and signifies the existence of the entire nation.306      
These words departed dramatically from Castro’s initial promises 
of absolute freedom of expression for all people, including critics of 
the government.307  With this new statement, Castro had changed the 
playing field, declaring that the only statements from artists and writers 
protected from government suppression were works that advanced the 
revolutionary state’s purposes and aims.308  Counterpoints in writing or 
artwork that criticized Castro’s government and proposed alternative 
programs, reforms, or structures of governance would now receive no 
legal protection whatsoever.309  
 
 304.  See Fidel Castro’s Speech to Intellectuals on 30 June 1961, Castro Speech Data Base, 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1961/19610630.html.  
 305.  Id. (“In the first place, permit me to tell you that the Revolution defends freedom . . . 
that because of its essence, the Revolution cannot be an enemy of freedoms, and that if anyone 
fears that the Revolution is 
going to stifle his creative spirit, that Concern is unnecessary and has no reason for being.”).  
 306.  Id.  
 307.  Compare supra text accompanying notes 121–123, with supra Part II.D.  
 308.  Castro’s Speech to Intellectuals, supra note 304 (“I believe this is quite clean. What 
are the rights of revolutionary or non-revolutionary writers and artists? Within the revolution, 
everything [;] against the revolution, no rights at all.”).  
 309.  See id.  
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Yet Castro was not done.  “This will not be any law of exception 
for writers and artists,” he continued.  “This will be a general principle 
for all citizens. It is a basic principle of the Revolution. 
Counterrevolutionaries—that is, the enemies of the Revolution—have 
no right against the Revolution, because the Revolution has a right: the 
right to exist, the right to develop, and the right to win.”310  Then, a few 
minutes later, he delivered his definitive statement on this topic: “The 
rights of the enemies of an entire people do not count in comparison 
with the rights of that people.”311    
By the end of this address, a new reality had descended upon all 
Cubans listening to their new leader’s remarks.  Contrary to his 
revolutionary promises, Castro had now made it clear that he would 
not tolerate any speech or expression from any Cuban citizen 
criticizing or questioning the revolution.312  By extension, since Castro 
himself was the face of the revolution, and now the leader of the post-
revolutionary Cuban nation, no forms of expression against Castro and 
his allies would receive any protection under Cuban law.313     
These remarks in 1961 accurately foreshadowed Cuba’s future 
under Castro’s leadership. Building upon his immense popularity 
following the overthrow of Batista, Castro quickly consolidated all 
governmental power under his new Partido Comunista Cubano 
(Cuban Communist Party), installing himself at the helm of the 
government.314  This was the start of a one-party regime that dominated 
Cuba under Castro’s leadership, ultimately proving to be as intolerant 
of countervailing views as the Batista dictatorship that Castro had 
demolished.315   
During his campaigns as a revolutionary, Castro had repeatedly 
promised to restore the Constitution of 1940 to protect fundamental 
 
 310.  Id.  
 311.  Id.  
 312.  See id.  
 313.  See id. 
 314.  TED HENKEN, CUBA: A GLOBAL STUDIES HANDBOOK 94 (2008).  
 315.  See, e.g., ANDRES J. SOLARES, CUBA: THE DISASTER OF CUBA’S REVOLUTION 87–89 
(2010); KATHERINE FORD, POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN CUBAN AND ARGENTINE THEATER 28–29 
(2010) (focusing on state-imposed censorship of theatre and other forms of artistic expression 
under Castro’s regime in post-revolutionary Cuba); JONATHAN GREEN & NICHOLAS J. 
KAROLIDES, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CENSORSHIP 132–33 (2009); Roger Reed, Censorship in 
Castro’s Cuba: ‘Against the Revolution, Nothing’, in PATTERNS OF CENSORSHIP AROUND THE 
WORLD 67 (Ilan Peleg, ed., 1993); Carlos Ripoll, The Press in Cuba, 1952–1960: 
Authoritarian and Totalitarian Censorship, in THE SELLING OF FIDEL CASTRO: THE MEDIA AND 
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 83 (William E. Ratliff, ed., 1987). 
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freedoms of all Cuban citizens.316  As a prime minister, however, he 
backed away from constitutional reform.317  Consequently, Cuba 
existed without a constitution for sixteen years.318  Lacking a written 
plan of government, Castro and the Communist Party installed laws by 
issuing decrees on an ad hoc basis.319  
Amid this climate of unfettered power, the Castro administration 
systematically eliminated sources of actual or potential dissent.320  The 
government closed independent print and broadcast media outlets, 
replacing them with multiple state-controlled newspapers, radio 
programs, and television stations.321  A Cuban news agency soon 
emerged as the largest such agency in the developing world, 
establishing more than thirty offices worldwide to spread Castro’s 
approved messages.322  Castro himself became a frequent editorialist in 
the government-run newspapers, particularly the state-sponsored daily 
paper Granma.323  Frequently, Castro would arrive unannounced at the 
Granma offices, painstakingly dictating matters as minute as where to 
place certain stories for the next day’s edition.324  
Chief among these new methods of expression control was the 
Committee of Revolutionary Orientation, charged with ensuring that 
 
 316.  Kemper, supra note 115; CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 37. 
 317.  Reed, supra note 315, at 67; Ripoll, supra note 315, at 94–95.  
 318.  Instead of a constitution, Castro enacted a “Fundamental Law” with one central 
purpose: to grant himself complete control over the Cuba.. Under this Fundamental Law, many 
civil liberties and political rights that the Constitution of 1940 had guaranteed to Cuban 
citizens evaporated completely. Jonathan Wachs, Reviving the 1940 Cuban Constitution: 
Arguments for Social and Economic Rights in a Post-Castro Government, 10 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 525, 545–46 (1996).   
 319.  Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Jan. 
28, 2011, at 4; ARON T. ULRICH, FOCUS ON CUBA: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 5 
(2008).  
 320.  See, e.g., SOLARES, supra note 315, at 87–89; Reed, supra note 315, at 67.  
 321.  See, e.g., THE MEDIA IN LATIN AMERICA 119 (Jario Lugo-Ocando, ed., 2008) (“The 
media were nationalized, and by the end of 1960 the whole system was under state control. . . . 
[C]ommercial media had become not only ideologically anachronistic, but also economically 
unfeasible: all the external trade and most of the internal, the banks . . . and more than a third 
of agriculture, were already in the hands of the government.”).  
 322.  NICHOLAS J. CULL, DAVID CULBERT & DAVID WELCH, PROPAGANDA AND MASS 
PERSUASION: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1500 TO THE PRESENT 69 (2003).  
 323.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CULTURES 
668–69 (Daniel Balderston, Mike Gonzalez & Ana M. Lopez, eds.,2002); CULL, CULBERT & 
WELCH, supra note 322, at 69; THE MEDIA IN LATIN AMERICA , supra note 321, at 122, 125. 
 324.  U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CUBA: CASTRO’S PROPAGANDA APPARATUS 
AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (Nov. 1984), 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000972183.
pdf [hereinafter “CIA BRIEF.”].  
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all Cubans followed the guiding principles of the revolution.325  
Overseen by two of Castro’s closest advisors, Antonio Perez Herrero 
and Orlando Fundora Lopez, the agency closely supervised every 
aspect of Cuban public life.326  In doing so, it became the engine from 
which Castro’s propaganda machine ran, with the government using 
various measures—including threats, intimidation, and punishments 
from around-the-clock surveillance to criminal prosecutions—to 
prevent dissidents’ voices from reaching a widespread audience.327  
Anyone who disobeyed Castro’s precepts for the life of “the new 
Cuba” was labelled an enemy of the revolution and penalized as a 
threat to the security of the Cuban state.328  By 1965, at least twenty 
thousand political prisoners were incarcerated in Cuba’s prisons and 
jails.329    
Within the first decade after Castro assumed power, nearly ten 
percent of Cuba’s population had left the country, primarily migrating 
to locations within the United States.330  Perhaps motivated in part by 
this discontent, and quite likely desiring to codify the principles of “his 
revolution,” Castro and his allies began pushing for the creation and 
adoption of a formal written constitution.331  Indeed, on February 1976, 
a new constitution went into effect, allegedly approved by an 
astounding 97.7 percent of all Cuban voters.332  
Yet anybody expecting Castro to finally deliver on his promise to 
 
 325.  HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 154.  
 326.  CIA BRIEF, supra note 324, at 6–7.  
 327.  See HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 154. This body was later renamed the Ideological 
Department of the Central Committee, but its basic mission was still the same. THE MEDIA IN 
LATIN AMERICA , supra note 321, at 123.  
 328.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER DAWSON, LATIN AMERICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: A HISTORY 
WITH PRIMARY SOURCES 249 (2014) (“Cubans, [Castro] argued, must unify to confront Cuba’s 
internal and external enemies. . . . As he convinced more and more Cubans that a liberated 
Cuba depended on his communist Revolution, he was also able to convince many that 
opposition amounted to treason.”); DIGITAL CULTURES AND THE POLITICS OF EMOTION: 
FEELINGS, AFFECT, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 199 (Athina Karatzogianni & Adi Kuntsman, 
eds., 2012) (“Protecting the Revolution from its enemies must therefore serve as a hard limit 
to freedom of expression in Cuba.”); ROBERT E. QUIRK, FIDEL CASTRO 411—13 (1995).  
 329.  CUBAN COMMUNISM 673 (8th ed., Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., 1995). This number is 
likely quite low, as Castro himself released this estimate through his state-controlled media 
outlets. ID. However, even this likely underestimated figure still represents a high ratio of 
prisoners: more than forty prisoners per 100,000 people in the total populace. ID. Castro 
justified this large number of political prisoners by stating that they were enemies of the state, 
or “counterrevolutionaries.” See ID. 
 330.  ID. This trend continued after 1969 in significant numbers, with many Cubans 
migrating to the State of Florida. See ID. at 26—29.  
 331.  See Sullivan, supra note 319, at 4; Wachs, supra note 318, at 546.  
 332.  Sullivan, supra note 319, at 4.  
POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW 3/16/2017  3:03 PM 
150 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:107 
 
restore the Constitution of 1940 would have been vastly disappointed 
by this document.  The constitution did guarantee a number of valuable 
social benefits for all Cubans, including free health care and free 
education for all citizens.333  On the other hand, however, the 
Constitution of 1976 effectively formalized the censorship and state 
control that had become the norm in Cuban everyday life.334  In 
particular, Article 53 of the constitution proclaimed:  
Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping with 
the objectives of socialist society. Material conditions for the exercise 
of that right are provided by the fact that the press, radio, television, 
movies and other organs of the mass media are State and social 
property and can never be private property. This assures their use at 
the exclusive service of the working people and in the interest of 
society. The law regulates the exercise of these freedoms.335 
Interestingly, Article 54 guaranteed all “working people” the 
freedoms of “assembly, demonstration, and association.”336  However, 
this apparent advancement in the realm of free expression was vastly 
curtailed later in the document.  Article 62 opened the door to complete 
governmental regulation of all individual liberties by stating:  
None of the freedoms which are recognized for citizens can be 
exercised contrary to what is established in the Constitution and the 
law, or contrary to the existence and objectives of the socialist State, 
or contrary to the existence and objectives of the Socialist state, or 
contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and 
communism. Violations of this principle can be punished by law.337 
Under this framework, the Castro government now had 
constitutional authority to unilaterally ban any speech or expression 
questioning any professed governmental aim.338  Not surprisingly, the 
 
 333.  See William T. D’Zurilla, Cuba’s 1976 Socialist Constitution and the Fidelista 
Interpretation of Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1223, 1247–48 (1981). 
 334.  Peter T. Johnson, The Nuanced Lives of the Intelligentsia, in ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA 
& JAMES A. MORRIS, CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN CUBA 146 (1993).  
 335.  CUBAN CONST. OF 1976, art. 53, 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Cuba%20Constitution.pdf (hereinafter “CONST. OF 
1976”).  
 336.  Id. at art. 54.  
 337.  Id. at art. 62. As a reminder of how harsh punishments for violating the objectives of 
the Socialist state in Cuba and the commands of the Cuban government, Article 65 read, in 
pertinent part: “Treason against one’s country is the most serious of crimes; those who commit 
it are subject to the most severe penalties.” Id. at art. 65.   
 338.  See D’Zurilla, supra note 333, at 1253–54. 
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regime exercised this power frequently in the years following the new 
constitution’s adoption, leading to virtually complete domination of all 
speech and expression by the state.339  To this day, backed by this blank 
check to prohibit “anti-government” speech and expression, Cuba 
remains one of the most heavily censored nations in the world.340  
E.  Tunisia and Egypt 
Of the nations examined within this article, perhaps the hardest to 
assess in the free speech and expression context are Tunisia and Egypt.  
Only five years have passed since the Arab Spring uprisings in both 
nations.341  Consequently, an especially small window of time exists in 
which to evaluate the post-revolutionary responses regarding free 
speech and expression in both nations, a period far shorter than the 
other states discussed here.  
However, even within this comparatively small time frame, 
several events in both nations demonstrate the now-familiar 
phenomenon of governments abridging free speech and expression in 
the aftermath of revolutions, despite strong revolutionary sentiments 
and promises to the contrary.342  Both nations’ new governments have 
engaged in both civil and criminal prosecutions of multiple dissenters 
expressing their views peaceably in the media, through forms of visual 
art and music, and on the public streets of their communities.343  
Concurrently, both nations have developed a climate of considerable 
government intrusion into the speech and expression of individuals and 
private organizations, demanding compliance with certain state-
 
 339.  See, e.g., THE MEDIA IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 321, at 121–22; Reed, supra note 
315, at 67.  
 340.  Rick Gladstone, Eritrea and North Korea Are World’s Most Censored Countries, 
Advocacy Group Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/eritrea-and-north-korea-are-worlds-most-
censored-countries-advocacy-group-says.html?_r=0; Cuba, Iran, China Among 10 Countries 
with Most Censorship, CPJ Says, FOX NEWS, (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2015/04/21/cuba-iran-china-among-10-countries-
with-most-censorship-cpj-says/.  
 341.  Tunisia’s uprising that toppled Ben Ali occurred in January 2011. SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION, AND CONTESTATION, supra note 149, at 241. Egypt’s revolt that 
forced Mubarak to flee the country occurred in February 2011. Kirkpatrick, supra note 153.   
 342.  For a review of promises demanded by revolutionaries in Tunisia and Egypt, and 
promises made by a number of their leaders, see generally supra Part I.E.  
 343.  See, e.g., Charlotte Schriwer, Graffiti Arts and the Arab Spring, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF THE ARAB SPRING: RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 381 (2014); Andreas 
Gorzewski, Post-Arab Spring Censorship on the Rise, DEUTSCHE WELLE, July 4, 2013, 
http://www.dw.de/post-arab-spring-censorship-on-the-rise/a-16725701.  
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approved positions, objectives, and beliefs.344           
Notably, however, both nations have also developed new 
constitutions that pay significant attention to protecting freedom of 
expression.  Article 31 of the constitution that Tunisia ratified in 2014 
declares that “[f]reedom of opinion, thought, expression, information 
and publication shall be guaranteed.”345  With a nod to the central role 
of the Internet and telecommunications in the 2011 revolution, Article 
32 guarantees Tunisian citizens “the right to information and the right 
of access to information and communication networks.”346  Subsequent 
provisions also guarantee the right to academic freedom, the right to 
vote, the right to establish political parties and unions, and the right to 
assemble in peaceful demonstrations.347  
Egypt’s new constitution, also enacted in 2014, likewise provides 
strong language regarding freedom of speech and expression. The 
leading provision in this area is Article 65, which states: “Freedom of 
thought and opinion is guaranteed. Every person shall have the right to 
express his/her opinion, verbally, in writing, though imagery, or by any 
other means of expression and publication.”348 Articles 66 and 67 
protect freedoms of scientific research and artistic expression.349 
Article 73 prohibits the state from monitoring peaceful private 
meetings, and allows Egyptian citizens to assemble peaceably after 
serving the government with proper notice of the intent to 
demonstrate.350  
Both of these constitutions appear to demonstrate a new 
commitment to freedom of speech and expression in these nations. Yet 
both plans of government also contain troubling provisions regarding 
these individual liberties, too. For instance, Article 1 of the Tunisian 
constitution pronounces Islam to be the official religion of Tunisia.351 
This gives rise to the question of whether the Tunisian government 
 
 344.  See, e.g., Joshua Kurlantzick, In the Arab Spring’s Aftermath, Democracy Retreats, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/democratization/arab-springs-aftermath-
democracy-retreats/p27138.  
 345.  TUNISIA CONST. OF 2014, art. 31, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf. 
 346.  Id. at art. 32.  
 347.  Id. at art. 33, 34, 35, 36 & 37.  
 348.  EGYPT CONST. OF 2014, art. 65, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf. 
 349.  Id. at art. 65 & 66.  
 350.  Id. at art. 73. The Constitution of 2014 calls this the guarantee of “Freedom of 
House.” See id.  
 351.  TUNISIA CONST., art. 1.   
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would utilize this provision to stifle speech and expression that is anti-
Islamic, questions or objects to certain precepts of Islam, or is deemed 
by the government to fly in the face of certain Muslim values.352  
Article 6 of this constitution raises further questions by declaring 
the state to be “the guardian of religion,” and by proclaiming that the 
Tunisian government shall undertake “the protection of the sacred.”353 
Again, this seems to open the door for the state to ban or limit speech 
and expression on the basis of violating Muslim beliefs.354 Heated 
ongoing debates about introducing a Tunisian penal law forbidding 
“blasphemy” of “sacred values” underscore the possibility of such 
proscriptions.355 Furthering this concern is the language of the second 
sentence within Article 31, the provision guaranteeing freedom of 
expression for Tunisian citizens. Implicit in the statement that “[t]hese 
freedoms shall not be subject to prior censorship” is the possibility—
and perhaps even the likelihood—that the government will engage in 
post-publication or post-utterance abridgements of speech and 
expression. The continued existence of laws from the Ben Ali regime 
allowing the government to punish individuals or groups for 
publishing materials deemed harmful to “public morals” prove that this 
type of action is far from an impossibility.356   
 
 352.  From the outset of the post-Arab Spring government, this concern has occupied a 
significant place in the minds of both Islamic conservatives and liberal secularists. See, e.g., 
Alexandra Sandels, Tunis Crowds Gather for Anti-Censorship March, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/10/tunisia-freedom-of-expression-
demonstration-elections-islamists-freedom-of-speech-nessma-tv-politics.html.   
 353.  TUNISIA CONST., art. 6.   
 354.  The language of this article appears to deliver the Tunisian government a blank check 
to prosecute any form of speech and expression as violating sacred beliefs. Without any 
definition of “sacred” or any further structure regarding the state’s role as “guardian of 
religion,” the government can wield tremendous power to censor speech and expression on 
religious grounds.   
 355.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BLASPHEMY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND 
TUNISIA’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2013); Alvin Powell, A Warning From Inside Tunisia, 
HARV. GAZETTE, Sept. 18, 2012, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/09/a-warning-
from-inside-tunisia/.Throughout the debates leading up to the enactment of Tunisia’s 2012 
and 2014 Constitutions, many Tunisian citizens pushed for a constitutional provision that 
specifically forbade blasphemous expression and allowed the government to criminalize such 
expression. See SHADI HAMID, TEMPTATIONS OF POWER: ISLAMISTS AND ILLIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST 182 (2014); Antoine Lambroschini, Blasphemy Clause 
to Be Dropped from New Tunisian Constitution, Speaker Says, GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 12, 
2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/blasphemy-clause-to-be-dropped-from-
new-tunisian-constitution-speaker-says/article4608262/.  
 356.  See, e.g., Eric Reidy, Questioning Freedom of Speech in Tunisia, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 
30, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/01/questioning-freedom-speech-tunisia-
150126104509780.html. 
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In the new Egyptian constitution, installed after a military coup 
toppled the post-Arab Spring president Morsi and replaced him with 
military leader Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, substantial questions remain 
regarding the government’s interactions with the media.357  Article 70 
guarantees freedom of the press for Egyptian citizens.358  However, in 
the same breath, it states that the Egyptian government must receive 
notification before any publisher can disseminate a newspaper, and 
that the state will regulate “procedures of establishing and owning” 
television, radio, and Internet media outlets.359  Article 71 allows the 
government to suspend or shut down media entities during “times of 
war or general mobilization.”360  Such provisions grant the state 
significant latitude to monitor and control the media and its messages 
to the general public.  
Another disconcerting component of the Egyptian constitution 
appears within Article 50, a section focusing on “Egypt’s civilization 
and cultural heritage, whether physical or moral.” According to the 
language within Article 50, any form of “aggression” toward this 
physical or moral heritage is a criminal offense.361  Importantly, the 
Article does not attempt to define the term “aggression.”  Therefore, 
an expansive reading of this provision could easily lead to widespread 
state censorship of any speech and expression that the government 
deems to be “aggression” toward a particular aspect of Egypt’s 
physical or moral heritage.362  
Just as important as these constitutional words are the actions 
occurring in both nations following their revolutions in 2011.  Within 
short time periods after both Mubarak and Ben Ali were ousted, 
citizens in both Egypt and Tunisia were arrested and charged under 
laws that prohibited broad categories of speech and expression.  For 
example, Tunisian rap musician Weld El 15 was sentenced to two 
 
 357.  See, e.g., Khaled Diab, Egypt’s Freedom of Repression, AL JAZEERA, Dec. 28, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/egypt-freedom-repression-
2014122883332498794.html; Sherif Mansour, As al-Sisi Promises Freedom of Speech, TV 
Host Youssef Is Put Under Investigation, COMM. FOR PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS, Sept. 
2014, https://cpj.org/blog/2014/04/as-al-sisi-promises-freedom-of-speech-satirical-tv.php.   
 358.  EGYPT CONST., art. 70.  
 359.  Id.  
 360.  Id. at art. 71.  
 361.  See EGYPT CONST., art. 71.  
 362.  Once again, the lack of any level of definition is problematic here. Such vague 
language could easily allow the Egyptian government to use “aggression” toward Egypt’s 
heritage as a pretext for punishing individuals who engage in speech or expression that the 
government simply does not like and wants to suppress.   
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years in prison for producing a music video in which he called the 
police force “dogs.”363  Egyptian television personality Bassem 
Youssef was charged multiple times under a statute prohibiting insults 
against the president, ultimately ending his show, leaving Egypt, and 
travelling to the United States.364  Tunisian television executive Nabil 
Karoui was fined for airing a film that included an animation 
representing the Muslim prophet Mohammed.365  Egyptian authorities 
imprisoned award-winning Al Jazeera journalists Baher Mohamed, 
Peter Greste, and Mohamed Fahmy for coverage that allegedly 
threatened Egypt’s national security and damaged the nation’s 
reputation.366   
Many other outspoken individuals suffered the same fate.367  
Bloggers, playwrights, visual artists, journalists with various media 
outlets, sympathizers with rival political movements, and citizens of 
all stripes who engaged in protests or were perceived as dissidents 
faced censure and sanctions from the new governments in Egypt and 
Tunisia.368  The situation seemed to grow particularly oppressive in 
Egypt, where more than 10,000 people were jailed—many of them on 
charges relating to speech and expression—between February 2011 
and January 2012 alone.369  A tremendous increase in cases for 
 
 363.  Tarek Amara, Rapper Weld el 15 Gets Two Years in Jail for Calling Police Dogs in 
Song, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 22, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/music/news/rapper-weld-el-15-gets-two-years-in-jail-for-calling-police-dogs-
in-song-8546156.html.   
 364.  Dean Obeidallah, Egypt’s Jon Stewart Comes to America, THE DAILY BEAST, Feb. 9, 
2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/09/egypt-s-jon-stewart-comes-to-
america.html. 
 365.  Marc Fisher, Tunisian Court Finds Broadcaster Guilty in Showing God’s Image, 
WASH. POST (May 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/tunisian-who-
showed-persepolis-on-tv-fined-in-free-speech-case/2012/05/03/gIQA0GpzyT_story.html.  
 366.  Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, A Year Later, Al Jazeera Journalists Still Imprisoned in 
Egypt, NPR, Dec. 29, 2014, http://www.npr.org/2014/12/29/373835075/a-year-later-al-
jazeera-journalists-still-imprisoned-in-egypt; Who are the al-Jazeera Journalists Tried in 
Egypt?, BBC, Feb. 13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27943387.   
 367.  See Calkins, supra note 131; Diab, supra note 357; Reidy, supra note 356. 
 368.  See, e.g., Tunisian Blogger Sentenced for Defaming Army, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 20, 2015, 
8:26 PM) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/tunisian-blogger-jailed-
defaming-army-2015120192721195412.html; Chad Elias, From Street to Screen: Graffiti, 
‘New Media’ and the Politics of Images in Post-Mubarak Egypt, in WALLS OF FREEDOM: 
STREET ART OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 89–91 (2014); Victor Salama, Three Years After 
the Arab Spring, Tunisian and Egyptian Musicians Continue to Fight Censorship, GLOBAL 
VOICES (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:00 AM) http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/08/29/music-
censorship-in-tunisia-and-egypt/#; Tarek Amara, Tunisian Artists Cry for Help Against 
Religious Extremists, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2012, 11:36 AM) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/us-tunisia-salafi-art-idUSBRE88I0SM20120919. 
 369.  Ironically, this mass imprisonment occurred even after Egypt’s new military regime 
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“religious defamation” occurred during the same time period.370  As 
one commentator stated about the situation in Egypt, “[E]ven a hint of 
sedition can lead to being thrown in jail.”371    
In the beginning, one might reasonably suspect that the continued 
censorship came at least in part from government officials who were 
part of the former regimes but remained in power after the revolutions, 
or from laws that simply remained “on the books” in the immediate 
turbulence after the old regime ended.372  However, as new leaders 
were installed in office and the governmental crackdowns on speech 
and expression continued, it became evident that these measures were 
more than just a carryover from past practices.373  Indeed, one of the 
most recent blows to free speech came in December 2014, when the 
Egyptian President al-Sisi announced that he would soon issue a law 
criminalizing speech or expression that insulted the January 2011 
revolution and the takeover of al-Sisi’s government in June 2013.374  
 
promised to scale back its use of the “emergency laws” so frequently invoked to censor speech 
and expression under Mubarak’s rule. See Egypt’s Infamous Emergency Law Expires, AL 
JAZEERA, (May 31, 2012, 17:20 GMT) 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/2012531134021732460.html; see also 
Huda Badri & Adham Youssef, Egypt is Witnessing Less Freedom of Expression Than Under 
Mubarak or Morsi: John R. Bradley, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Aug. 23, 2014), 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/08/23/egypt-witnessing-less-freedom-expression-
mubarak-morsi-john-r-bradley/. 
 370.  Gorzewski, supra note 343. One of the toughest challenges to freedom of expression 
in post-Arab Spring Egypt comes from criticisms of Islam or advocacy for religions beyond 
Islam. See, e.g., James Michael Nossett, Free Exercise After the Arab Spring: Protecting 
Egypt’s Religious Minorities Under the Country’s New Constitution, 89 IND. L.J. 1653, 1658, 
1683 (2014) (stating that Egyptian law continues to leave speech and expression against Islam 
or in favor of other religious beliefs unprotected). 
 371.  Dan Murphy, Egypt’s Constitutional Referendum: It’s Not About Democracy Any 
More, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-
Watch/Backchannels/2014/0115/Egypt-s-constitutional-referendum-It-s-not-about-
democracy-any-more.-video. 
 372.  For instance, after Ben Ali fled Tunisia, Ben Ali’s former Prime Minister Mohamed 
Ghannouchi—a man who had held multiple ministerial posts under Ben Ali’s regime since 
1989—immediately assumed the role of interim president. Accused of being too close to the 
old regime, he ultimately resigned. Kim Willsher, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed 
Ghannouchi Resigns Amid Unrest, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2011, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/27/tunisian-prime-minister-ghannouchi-
resigns. In Egypt, after Mubarak stepped down, the top official of the military government was 
Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, who “served for decades as a top official of Mr. Mubarak’s 
government.” Kirkpatrick, supra note 153. 
 373.  See, e.g., Hend Kortam, Calls for a ‘Religious Revolution’, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Jan. 
13, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/13/calls-religious-revolution.   
 374.  Sonia Farid, Insulting Egypt’s Revolutions: Criminalization vs. Free Speech, AL 
ARABIYA NEWS, Dec. 11, 2014, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/12/11/Insulting-Egypt-s-
revolutions-Between-criminalization-and-free-speech.html. 
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The president claimed that such a law would be “the only way to show 
respect to Egyptians who sacrificed their lives for freedom and 
democracy.”375  A number of Egyptians greeted this announcement 
with praise.376 Others, however, responded angrily, stating that this 
statute would be just another restriction on what they could say and do 
regarding their nation’s government.377         
On the whole, one could reasonably argue that the question of 
how the post-revolutionary governments in Tunisia and Egypt treated 
the freedoms of speech and expression remains an evolving matter.  
Certainly, time will tell how both of these post-revolutionary nations 
are judged in this category.  However, one can still draw conclusions 
about the initial reactions regarding these freedoms after the Arab 
Spring revolutions in both states.  An outward commitment to freedom 
of speech and expression, from public statements to speeches before 
the United Nations and political leaders from other nations to strong 
language in new constitutions, characterizes Tunisia and Egypt 
immediately following their 2011 revolts.  However, the real-world 
situations in both states demonstrate an overall environment of chilling 
and repressing expression that the regimes in power deems 
unfavourable or dangerous — a reality that seems far away from the 




 375.  Id.  
 376.  See id. (quoting political leaders stating that the government needed this law to 
maintain stability in Egypt and quoting a legal expert stating that the criminal charges for 
“insults” were justified as speech and expression likely to incite violence).  
 377.  Shadi Bushra, Egypt to Criminalize Insults to ‘Revolutions’ of 2011 and 2013: 
Spokesman, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/03/us-egypt-sisi-
revolutions-idUSKCN0JH2AM20141203 (criticizing al-Sisi and his cabinet for trying to 
criminalize speech and expression solely to consolidate his power over the country); Nourhan 
Magdi, ‘Insults’ to Jan[.] 25 and June 30 Will Be Criminalized, CAIRO POST, Dec. 3, 2014, 
http://www.thecairopost.com/news/130184/news/insults-to-jan-25-and-june-30-will-be-
criminalized-2 (“Lawyer Mohamed Zarea told VetoGate the law is “coercion” to citizens to 
adopt one opinion, which he added is inconsistent with the freedom of opinion and expression 
guaranteed in the constitution.”).  
 378.  In addition to the reportage of current conditions already discussed, see, e.g., Andrew 
Hammond, Cinema and Television, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MODERN ARAB 
CULTURE 171–72 (Dwight F. Reynolds, ed., 2015); Mark Bousquet, Holding Strong Against 
the Rise of Censorship in Egypt and Tunisia, COMIC BOOK LEGAL PROTECTION FUND, Apr. 16, 
2013, http://cbldf.org/2013/04/holding-strong-against-the-rise-of-censorship-in-egypt-and-
tunisia/.  
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III.  CONNECTING THE DOTS: IDENTIFYING TRENDS LEADING POST-
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTS TO ABRIDGE PROMISED RIGHTS 
OF FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION   
The preceding sections described six revolutions in which 
freedom of speech and expression was a primary objective for the 
revolutionaries, and a key promise for the government that either took 
or was permitted to retain power following the revolution.  Despite 
these goals and promises, however, the populations in each of these 
post-revolutionary states quickly experienced substantial government-
imposed reductions in freedom of speech and expression. In laws and 
deeds, these new or reformed governments significantly abridged 
speech and expression rights of the people in short order, breaking their 
promises to the citizenry and defeating one of the principal goals for 
which the revolution was fought in the first place.  
As discussed in Part I, each nation entered its respective 
revolution with a unique perspective about freedom of speech and 
expression.  Some movements, such as the Cuban Revolution, called 
for absolute legal protection for all forms of speech and expression.  
Others, such as the American Revolution and the French Revolution, 
arose with the population comprehending a more limited measure of 
free speech and expression, allowing for restrictions on categories of 
speech that were injurious in some fundamental way to the state or to 
the general public’s well-being.  Still, even those nations utilizing a 
narrower starting-point definition of free speech and expression 
recognized a degree of individual liberty that was considerably greater 
than what their immediate post-revolutionary governments 
provided.379 
Thus, remarkable consistency in immediate outcomes exists 
among the six revolutions described here, even though these events 
occurred in different nations, for different causes, and during a wide 
range of differing time periods.  The remaining question, then, is 
whether any consistency also exists in the causes of these post-
revolutionary governmental reactions against the promised civil 
liberties of free speech and expression.  This section takes up that 
important question and identifies some answers by studying 
commonalities among the post-revolutionary state actions in the 
nations discussed above.  
 
 379.  See generally supra Parts I–II.  
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A.  Revolutionary Promises Regarding Free Speech and 
Expression Establish False Expectations Among the Population 
Hopeful governmental leaders have much to gain from making 
sizeable promises to revolutionaries.  For a political aspirant, winning 
popularity among revolutionary participants could result in a fast track 
to power if the revolution ultimately succeeds.  For an existing 
officeholder, currying favour with the supporters of a revolution that 
seems destined to succeed can lead to self-preservation, remaining in 
power after agreeing to grant certain demands of the revolutionary 
movement.  
Unfortunately, the promises made during a revolutionary fervor 
frequently prove to be untenable in the light of reality.380  Plenty of 
vows that sound beautiful on paper or in a speech do not translate 
effectively to the realities of day-to-day governance.381  Transitions 
into a brand-new or dramatically reformed government are typically 
messy on many levels, and successes do not occur overnight.382  Yet 
few post-revolutionary governments want to engage in tempering the 
expectations of the public.  Instead, they generally prefer to ride the 
wave of promises that brought them into power or retained them in 
power during the revolution.383  Before long, a widening chasm opens 
between the promised state and the actual state, leading to newfound 
unrest among a population that hoped for instantaneously brighter 
 
 380.  For one example, consider the often-invoked revolutionary promise of greater—or 
even total—equality among a nation’s citizens. Such a claim presents a tremendously 
attractive picture to a frustrated citizenry. However, even if the new post-revolutionary 
government manages to enact laws providing equality in “the formal, legal sense,” achieving 
actual equality among all citizens in the nation eludes the government. See FRIEDRICH JULIUS 
STAHL, THE DOCTRINE OF STATE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE LAW 60 (Ruben Alvarado, 
trans. & ed., 2009).   
 381.  See ID.   
 382.  See, e.g., EGYPT IN WILLIAMSBURG: CHALLENGES OF A POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 4 
(Reginald Dale, ed., 2014); VLADIMIR MAU & IRINA STARODUBROVSKAIA, THE CHALLENGE OF 
REVOLUTION: CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 126–28 (2001); Nicholas 
Kristof, Egypt’s Reassuringly Messy Democracy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, 
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/egypts-reassuringly-messy-democracy/. 
 383.  Some political scientists believe this attitude to be emblematic of a “honeymoon 
period,” during which anything seems possible, even the most implausible promises made in 
the heat of revolutionary fervor. See Jack A. Goldstone, Bringing Regimes Back In: Explaining 
Success and Failure in the Middle East Revolts of 2011, in THE ARAB REVOLUTION OF 2011: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 68 (Saïd Amir Arjomand, ed., 2015); BAILEY STONE, THE 
ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION REVISITED: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE AND 
RUSSIA 200, 209, 221 (2013); PHILIP ABBOTT, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: 
CONVERSATION AND DEBATE 46 (4th ed. 2009); CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF 
REVOLUTION 91 (1965).  
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days.384    
In the United States, for instance, the First Amendment to the Bill 
of Rights promises that “Congress shall make no law” abridging free 
speech, a pledge that seems absolute.385  However, a look at the context 
of the times demonstrates that the drafters of this language almost 
certainly did not intend to prevent the government from ever restricting 
the speech of American citizens, even if this language gives the 
impression that such limitations are always constitutionally 
forbidden.386  In France, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen swore allegiance to liberty of expression that did not 
“disturb the public order” — a guarantee that neither King Louis XVI 
nor Robespierre would ultimately uphold.387  In Cuba, Castro promised 
absolute protection of speech and expression, even speech and 
expression that denounced him and his allies.388  This vow, too, quickly 
went by the wayside.389  Similar results arose from the other revolutions 
studied in this article as well.390       
Some of these promises evaporate because the leader making or 
agreeing to the pledges never truly intends to keep them.391  In early 
twentieth-century Russia, the czar’s promises regarding freedom of 
expression in the October Manifesto fall into this category.392 
Commentators describe the czar’s aching reluctance to surrender any 
powers traditionally associated with absolutist rule to the Russian 
people.393  Doing so seems to be solely an act of self-preservation in 
 
 384.  This realization of promises not kept is part of the natural and often-rapid emotional 
decline following the post-revolutionary “honeymoon period.” See Jon Lee Anderson, Where 
Protests End, NEW YORKER, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/where-protests-end; BRINTON, supra note 383, at 237.  
 385.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 386.  See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.  
 387.  See supra Parts I. B., Part II.B.  
 388.  See supra Part I.D.  
 389.  See supra Part II.D.  
 390.  For example, consider the promises that revolutionary leaders in Tunisia and Egypt 
made during the Arab Spring, and the ultimate results that led to continued censorship of 
speech and expression in both nations. Compare supra Part I.E, with Part II.E.  
 391.  S. Curry Jansen & Brian Martin, Exposing and Opposing Censorship: Backfire 
Dynamics in Freedom-of-Speech Struggles, 10 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REV. 29, 31 (2004) (“[It] 
is well known that free expression is given widespread lip service in the same contexts in 
which censorship is widely practiced.”).   
 392.  See supra Part II.C. 
 393.  WORTMAN, supra note 81, at 363 (stating that Nicholas II told members of the 
imperial military from the outset that he might require them to use force to dissolved the Duma 
at his whim). 
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the face of a desperate citizenry.394  From the outset, it seems that the 
czar made few efforts to fulfill these vows, failing to even create a 
reasonable façade of trying to pursue these promised reforms.395 
Others, however, terminate despite the best intentions of their 
makers, crumbling because they are virtually impossible to fully 
execute.  Many revolutionary promises regarding freedom of speech 
and expression fall into this latter category.  Establishing a society in 
which speech and expression is never restricted is arguably an 
attractive proposition at first glance. In practice, however, such a 
concept becomes unsustainable.  Several categories of speech and 
expression could spur a nation’s complete downfall if left completely 
unchecked, such as fraud, conspiracy to commit crimes, betrayal of 
state secrets to an enemy force, and speech or expression aimed at 
inciting mass violence.396  Thus, expecting any government to refrain 
from ever imposing any restrictions on speech and expression is a hope 
that is far from realistic.397  
Still, it is a hope to which many people cling after hearing the 
words of revolutionary leaders, comments that are often presented in 
absolute or near-absolute terms.  Before long, however, these leaders 
find such unqualified promises impossible to keep — if they ever 
intended to keep them in the first place — and turn to a level of 
censorship in which they had seemingly vowed never to engage.398  
This, in turn, leads to the potential for dissatisfaction among a once-
expectant, now-disillusioned, citizenry, establishing more reasons for 
 
 394.  PIPES, supra note 70, at 44 (“The [October Manifesto] was extracted from Nicholas 
II under duress, virtually at the point of a gun. For this reason he never felt morally obligated 
to respect it.”). 
 395.  See supra Part II.C. 
 396.  For just a few of many relatively recent articles discussing this topic and the need for 
some state-produced restrictions upon speech and expression, see Martin H. Redish & Michael 
J. T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy As Free Expression, 76 ALB. L. REV. 697, 697–700 
(2013); Todd Stedeford, Prior Restraint and Censorship: Acknowledged Occupational 
Hazards for Government Scientists, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 725, 725–26 
(2007); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765–77 (2004).   
 397.  Indeed, even a laissez-faire free speech theorist such as John Stuart Mill allowed for 
significant exceptions to his pro-freedom of expression mindset. According to Mill, 
restrictions that guarded against “serious forms of perceptible damage that nobody should be 
forced to suffer” were allowable in the name of public justice. See, e.g., Jonathan Riley, Mill, 
Liberalism, and Exceptions to Free Speech, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: COUNTING THE COSTS 
(Glen Newey, ed., 2009).   
 398.  See generally supra Part II (describing the multiple instances in which post-
revolutionary governments quickly breach their revolutionary promises to the people 
regarding freedom of speech and expression).  
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the post-revolutionary government to restrict the expressions of a 
dissenting populace.           
B.  Post-Revolutionary Governments Fear Overthrow from the 
“Revolutionary Spirit” That Brought Them to Power  
The period following a revolution is a volatile time. Outcomes of 
such a substantial upheaval are rarely neat and tidy.399  Newly installed 
leaders or holdover governors who are permitted to remain understand 
that people of their nation possess the capacity to revolt when 
dissatisfied.400  With one partially or completely successful revolution 
complete, members of the population may feel compelled to stage 
another uprising if they feel as if their needs are still going 
unaddressed.401   
Additionally, none of the revolutions discussed in this article 
received uniform support from a nation’s populace.402  Therefore, even 
after one revolution ends, opponents of the post-revolutionary 
government still remain among the citizenry, dissenters who could 
gather support and ultimately stage a revolution of their own.403  
Situations like the rise of the Jacobin faction in France, the Bolshevik 
overthrow of the Czar Nicholas II in Russia, and the post-Arab Spring 
coup in Egypt that installed al-Sisi in power demonstrate that these 
post-revolutionary governmental overthrows are certainly within the 
realm of possibility.404 
In an effort to prevent such actions, post-revolutionary leaders 
turn to measures restricting the public’s freedom to express opposing 
views, hoping that stifling the spread of dissent will preserve the new 
government’s existence.  For instance, Czar Nicholas II’s severe 
restrictions on protestors, media outlets, and other forms of expression 
even after issuing the October Manifesto arose, at least in part, from 
 
 399.  See, e.g., EMORY ELLIOTT, REVOLUTIONARY WRITERS: LITERATURE AND AUTHORITY 
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1725-1810 11 (2014); Alexander S. Gard-Murray & Yaneer Bar-Yam, 
Complexity and the Limits of Revolution: What Will Happen to the Arab Spring?, in CONFLICT 
AND COMPLEXITY: COUNTERING TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, ETHNIC AND REGIONAL VIOLENCE 
290 (Philip vos Fellman, Yaneer Bar-Yam & Ali A. Minai, eds., 2014).   
 400.  Indeed, history has proven that rapid changes in post-revolutionary governments, and 
even full-fledged revolts in the wake of a revolutionary transition, are quite common. See, e.g., 
BRINTON, supra note 383, at 123, 237, 250..  
 401.  See, e.g., STEVEN A. COOK, THE STRUGGLE FOR EGYPT: FROM NASSER TO TAHIR 
SQUARE 300 (2011).  
 402.  See supra Parts I & II.  
 403.  See id.; see also BRINTON, supra note 383, at 123, 237, 250.   
 404.  See supra Parts II.B–D.   
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the fear that too much dissention would result in the complete loss of 
his power.405  When he dissolved the First and Second Duma, he did so 
only after the discussions regarding substantial governmental reforms 
intensified to a level that threatened his monarchy.406  
Likewise, Castro’s strict control on speech and expression in post-
revolutionary Cuba focused directly on preventing the 
counterrevolutionary forces within the small nation from gaining 
enough traction to throw him out of office.407  Laws criminalizing 
“insulting the president” and other government leaders in Egypt and 
Tunisia serve as protective blankets for the leaders currently in power 
within these still-combustible states, shielding them from dissenting 
statements that could plant seeds for a new revolution among their 
citizens.408  The Alien and Sedition Acts in the post-revolutionary 
United States were aimed at preserving the Federalist Party’s new 
stranglehold on the federal government, keeping the rival Democratic-
Republicans out of office.409      
Vladimir Lenin allegedly once compared granting the general 
public freedom of speech with committing suicide.410  For many 
immediate post-revolutionary leaders, this comparison seems apt.  The 
individuals studied within this article were well-aware that extreme 
social turmoil brought them into power or permitted them to remain in 
power after assenting to popular demands.411  Their fear of meeting a 
 
 405.  See supra Part II.C.  
 406.  Id.  
 407.  For instance, consider the statements that Castro made shortly after assuming office: 
“Counterrevolutionaries — that is, the enemies of the Revolution — have no right against the 
Revolution . . . The rights of the enemies of an entire people do not count in comparison with 
the rights of that people.” See notes 310–11. Article 62 of Castro’s Constitution of 1976 
expresses a similar focus on preventing Cuban “counterrevolutionary” forces from gathering, 
declaring that Cuban citizens could not exercise any freedom — even constitutionally 
protected freedoms—that the government deemed “contrary to the existence and objectives of 
the socialist State.”  
 408.  See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text (describing vaguely worded laws 
passed under previous regimes in Tunisia and Egypt that greatly limit expression from political 
dissidents).. One can find another example of such self-protecting efforts from al-Sisi’s vow 
to enact a law criminalizing any expression that “insults” the January 2011 or June 2013 
revolutions in Egypt. See supra notes 374–375 and accompanying text.  
 409.  See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.  
 410.  Supra note 300.  
 411.  King Louis XVI and Robespierre, Czar Nicholas II, Castro, the post-Ben Ali 
leadership in Tunisia, the post-Mubarak leadership in Egypt, and even John Adams and the 
Federalist Party heads in the United States all understood that their positions in power were 
tenuous, a fact underscored by the volatile political and social climate in each of their 
respective nations. See Part II, supra.  
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similar fate, either at the hands of dissatisfied revolutionaries or 
through an uprising of newly empowered opponents of the revolution, 
is understandable.  In such situations, abridging freedom of expression 
becomes a self-preservation tool, one that leaders in the aftermath of 
revolutions wield with varying levels of impunity.412    
However, this reason alone cannot explain why post-
revolutionary leaders restrict expression to such a vast degree.  One 
would expect that revolutionaries who had overthrown the personal 
liberties of speech and expression would rebel again once the post-
revolutionary government proscribed these freedoms.  Similarly, one 
could imagine that opponents of the revolution could leverage the 
broken promises regarding free speech and expression to raise support 
for overthrowing the post-revolutionary regime.  Given that post-
revolutionary governments manage to prevent overthrow by limiting 
expression without being overthrown by citizens angry about such 
abridgements, other factors must play into the equation of why these 
restrictions emerge and prevail in the aftermath of revolutions.  
C.  Freedom of Expression Is Easy to Curtail  
Among the ways in which governments exercise control over 
their citizens, constraining freedom of expression is one of the easier 
measures to execute.  All of the post-revolutionary leaders discussed 
in this article accomplished these restrictions through a variety of 
quickly and simply implemented actions.  The most common methods 
that these states employed to abridge freedom of expression without 
sparking an uprising include:   
1.  Portraying Expression Restrictions as Necessary for Personal 
Safety 
This is perhaps the tool that post-revolutionary governments 
utilize most frequently in reducing or eliminating free speech and 
expression rights.  By depicting certain types of speech as dangerous 
to the entire nation’s well-being, leaders often obtain support from 
citizens who are understandably concerned about their own security.  
This strategy permits the state wide latitude to limit expression, 
particularly expression that criticizes the government in power, its 
activities, and its purported values.413  Denouncing dissenters as 
“enemies” or “subversives,” and couching boundaries upon speech and 
 
 412.  See supra Part II.  
 413.  See supra Part II.  
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expression in terms of protecting all citizens from harm, frequently lets 
post-revolutionary governments abridge freedom of speech and 
expression for a reason that many people can accept as quite beneficial 
to their personal welfare.414 
This methodology is not unique to post-revolutionary states.415  
However, it appears particularly effective in nations that have recently 
experienced a revolution.416  Perhaps this is due at least in part to the 
traumatic impact that any significant uprising leaves upon many 
members of the population.417  After through a period of social 
upheaval, it seems logical that plenty of individuals—particularly 
people who opposed the revolution or were ambivalent about the 
revolution—would support a government that pledged to protect them 
and their loved ones from harm, even if rigorous state-imposed limits 
upon speech and expression were purportedly necessary for such 
protections.      
In the United States, passing and enforcing the Alien and Sedition 
Acts epitomized the effective usage of this strategy.418  Although these 
statutes were highly charged with political preservationist objectives, 
the public face of these laws focused on protecting Americans from 
harm.419  Weeding out anyone within the nation who sympathized with 
France, a new enemy that was allegedly marshalling forces for an 
imminent attack against the United States, captured significant support 
 
 414.  See supra Part II.  
 415.  Plenty of so-called “developed” states engaged in this practice in the past, and plenty 
continue to leverage this strategy today. For a couple of examples, see BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, 
STATES, AND FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA 81—82 (2d ed. 2008); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006); Marjorie Heins, The Supreme 
Court and Political Speech in the 21st Century: The Implications of Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 76 ALB. L. REV. 561 (2013).  
 416.  See supra Part II (discussing multiple examples of government leaders successfully 
utilizing this strategy in the immediate aftermath of revolutions).   
 417.  While the present article is not a psychological study, it seems almost self-evident 
that living among social and political turmoil—including acts of violence—for any significant 
period of time would leave a significant mental scar and a desire for peace and stability. Other 
commentators agree with this notion. See, e.g., Barry Shapiro, The Impact of Trauma in the 
Early French Revolution, 34 W. SOC’Y FOR FRENCH HIST.  73 (2006), 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wsfh/0642292.0034.005?view=text;rgn=main; Richard Lezin 
Jones, Trauma Runs Deep for Exiles: Those Who Suffered Under Castro Maintain Keen 
Memories of Loss, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Apr. 9, 2000), http://articles.philly.com/2000-04-
09/news/25591475_1_elian-gonzalez-exiles-cuban-revolution  (“A social revolution is a 
profound, heart-rending, traumatic event”).  
 418.  See supra Part II.A..  
 419.  Supra notes 172–172, 182–184, and accompanying text.  
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from the American population.420  While plenty of people soon 
criticized these laws, the strong anti-French sentiments in the United 
States provided the ideal platform for enacting a law promising to 
discover and punish any subversive enemies trying to do their work 
inside America’s borders.421         
More than two hundred years after the United States enacted the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, one can witness a similar effect within post-
Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia.422  National laws punishing people 
who criticize the government, its leaders, or the accepted state religion 
appear before the citizenry under the umbrella of maintaining order, 
preserving basic values, and protecting people from harm.423  As with 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, this message has gathered public support 
for many of these expression-restricting laws in Egypt and Tunisia, 
including the Egyptian measure banning anyone from criticizing the 
2011 and 2013 revolutions and the Tunisian penal provisions 
forbidding speech and expression that “undermine public morality, 
although these measures certainly face plenty of public opposition as 
well.”424    
In Cuba, Castro also mastered this framework after seizing power. 
His speech to the Cuban people in 1961 announced that “[t]he rights 
of the enemies of an entire people do not count in comparison with the 
rights of that people.”425  Anybody whose expressions opposed or 
criticized the Castro regime was pronounced an enemy of the 
revolution and an enemy of the entire nation.426  From that point 
forward, utilizing a platform that pitted his “revolutionaries” against 
“counterrevolutionaries,” Castro succeeded in essentially eradicating 
the speech and expression rights for these “enemies of an entire 
people.”427  While plenty of Cubans did not like these blanket bans on 
dissent, and many Cuban citizens migrated elsewhere, Castro’s 
declarations that these laws and policies kept Cubans safe from 
“enemies” maintained enough acceptance among the populace that the 
 
 420.  Supra notes 172–177.  
 421.  Supra notes 178–184 and accompanying text.  
 422.  See supra Part II.E.  
 423.  This includes provisions of the new written constitutions adopted in both Tunisia and 
Egypt. Id. 
 424.  See, e.g., supra notes 373–377.  
 425.  Supra note 304.  
 426.  See supra Part II.D.   
 427.  Castro accomplished this using his early program of ruling by decree and his 
constitutionally permitted privileges under the Constitution of 1976. See supra notes 319–320 
and accompanying text.   
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Communist leader avoided overthrow.428 
Still another example occurred in France after the monarchy of 
Louis XVI fell.  Notably, it was the “Committee on Public Safety,” a 
body that by its very name professed to protect French citizens from 
harm, that quickly seized control of the country.429  The laws that soon 
followed the Committee’s empowerment continued along this pathway 
of ostensibly saving the nation from itself.430  The Law of Suspects, for 
example, permitted the government to punish all people whom the 
state believed to be “partisans of tyranny and federalism, and the 
enemies of freedom.”431  Once again, the structure of rooting out 
enemies to protect the citizenry found a home within the post-
revolutionary freedom of expression abridgment rhetoric.            
Openings for these constraints upon expression often arise within 
the constitutions or other guiding documents that post-revolutionary 
leaders create.  The most overt example among the nations studied in 
this article comes from Cuba’s Constitution of 1976, which blatantly 
outlawed any forms of expression questioning or criticizing the 
revolution, the Communist Party, or any values related to the 
Communist Party’s leadership.432  Similarly, France’s Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen and the subsequent Constitution of 
1791, Russia’s Fundamental Laws, and the recent Tunisian and 
Egyptian constitutions all contain language reserving the 
government’s power to proscribe expression for the state’s “greater 
good.”433  
These provisions generally formed and continued with significant 
acceptance, if not outright support, from the populations of these post-
revolutionary states.  Thus, when it comes to state-sponsored attempts 
to abridge freedom of speech and expression, it appears that 
accompanying these restrictions with the promise of ensuring safety 
from a real or perceived foe is a powerful and effective means of 
delivery.  
 
 428.  See id.; see also supra notes 327–329.   
 429.  Supra note 233.  
 430.  See supra notes 239–245 and accompanying text.  
 431.  Supra note 245.  
 432.  Supra notes 334–337 and accompanying text.  
 433.  See supra notes 219–222, 269–278, 351–362, and accompanying text.  
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2.  Leveraging Post-Revolutionary Nationalism  
Emotions run high in the aftermath of a revolution.434  For the 
victors of a revolt, the period that immediately follows often is awash 
in a robust, almost blinding sense of pride in their triumph.435  As a 
unifying force, this newfound nationalism can be an important means 
of settling a still-unstable populace, or rallying the people behind the 
unified objective of preserving and strengthening their new 
governmental creation.436  As a means of legitimizing broken 
revolutionary promises regarding freedom of expression, however, 
these sentiments offer an influential instrument that a nation’s new 
leaders can use.  
Nationalism becomes a particularly effective device within states 
where a revolution results in a complete change in power.437  Fierce 
post-revolutionary pride and a sense of uniting the new nation against 
a common enemy helped spur the passage of the Sedition Act in the 
United States.438  Castro used the inflamed spirit of patriotism in the 
“new Cuba” to gain support for his restrictions on speech and 
expression, with a noticeable number of Cuban citizens accepting his 
proclamations that these decrees were for the greater national good.439  
Today, a substantial number of individuals in post-revolutionary Egypt 
and Tunisia independently voice their support for statutes and actions 
that hamper freedom of speech and expression in their nations, stating 
that these measures keep their countries’ values and identities—
including their religious heritages—strong.440  Some Egyptian and 
Tunisian citizens openly state that too much freedom of expression 
could weaken the core of their nations, citing this as the central reason 
 
 434.  See generally supra Part II.  
 435.  See Mehran Kamrava, Ruling Bargains in the Middle East, in KAMRAVA, supra note 
209, at 44; SAMUEL FARBER, ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED 5, 130–31 
(2007); JONATHAN D. SASSI, A REPUBLIC OF RIGHTEOUSNESS: THE PUBLIC CHRISTIANITY OF 
THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND CLERGY (2001); Avner Ben-Amos, Monuments 
and Memory in French Nationalism, 5 HIST. & MEMORY 50, 55 (1993).  
 436.  See id. Some commentators refer to this phenomenon specifically as “state 
nationalism.” Peri Pamir, Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy: Contemporary 
Manifestations, INT’L J. OF PEACE STUDIES, 
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2_2/pamir.htm.  
 437.  See, e.g., supra Part II.A–E.  
 438.  Supra notes 162–177 and accompanying text.  
 439.  See, e.g., supra notes 325–329 and accompanying text.  
 440.  See Mansoor Moaddel, The Birthplace of the Arab Spring: Values and Perceptions 
of Tunisians and a Comparative Assessment of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, Saudi, 
Tunisian, and Turkish Publics, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND 
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 3 (2013), http://mevs.org/files/tmp/Tunisia_FinalReport.pdf. 
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why a “Western conception” of free speech and expression may never 
succeed in their lands.441         
Nationalistic sympathies tend to draw attention away from the 
loss of individual liberties, subordinating these freedoms to the overall 
well-being of the nation.442  For some ardently patriotic individuals, 
these sentiments give certain post-revolutionary governments a free 
pass to constrain speech and expression.  To them, the broken promises 
regarding these freedoms are acceptable, or at least tolerable, as long 
as the government’s professed reasons for limiting personal rights 
focus on improving the betterment of the nation as a whole.   
3.  Lack of a Meaningful Opposition Force  
The examples of post-revolution censorship described in this 
article were aimed largely at stifling opponents to the newly 
empowered government.443  In many of these cases, the lack of a well-
organized opposition force allowed these restrictive measures to 
flourish.  Without enough people combating the state’s broken 
promises regarding freedom of speech and expression, the new 
government’s laws and actions proscribing these liberties were able to 
remain in effect without even facing a significant challenge to their 
continuation.  
This effect contributed largely to the creation of the Sedition Act 
in the aftermath of the American Revolution.444  With the Federalist 
Party controlling every branch in Washington, D.C., this restrictive 
measure became a law with relative ease.445  While the Democratic-
Republicans grew to oppose the Sedition Act, this party did not have 
enough of a presence to truly challenge the Federalists at the time when 
Congress passed this bill.446  With one faction monopolizing the federal 
government, the interests of that group dominated affairs in the United 
 
 441.  See RAPHAEL ISRAELI, FROM ARAB SPRING TO ISLAMIC WINTER 294–95 (2013); John 
Irish, At U.N., Muslim World Questions Western Freedom of Speech, REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/29/us-un-assembly-islam-
idUSBRE88R1JI20120929.  
 442.  See, e.g., DAVID BROWN, CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM 95 (2003); LIAH 
GREENFIELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 176 (1992).   
 443.  See supra Part III C–D.1 and D.3; see also Ben-Amos, supra note 435, at 55.   
 444.  See supra Part II.A.  
 445.  See supra notes 185 & 189.  
 446.  The Democratic-Republicans adamantly opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts, and 
publically expressed their displeasure with these pieces of legislation. However, as the 
minority party in all three branches of the federal government, they could not prevent these 
four bills from passing. See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.  
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States at that time, with few areas where opposing voices could 
establish footholds.447     
An even starker example of this principle at work appears in 
nations where an opposition movement did not even have a noticeable 
voice.  After the Committee for Public Safety took over the French 
government, for example, Robespierre and his allies eradicated every 
dissenter—real and perceived—whom they could find.448  Czar 
Nicholas II and Prime Minister Stolypin did the same for a number of 
years following the Revolution of 1905.449  Likewise, Castro was quite 
successful in removing any dissidents from Cuba under his leadership, 
quickly smothering any noticeable chances for countervailing views to 
gain a presence in public or political discourse.450 
Interestingly, the two nations studied here that appeared to have 
the most active movements opposing restrictions from the immediate 
post-revolution regimes are Tunisia and Egypt.451  Almost immediately 
after post-Arab Spring leaders in these countries instituted strict limits 
on freedom of speech and expression, protests against these measures 
emerged among members of the public and from members of both the 
formal and informal media.  Still, while these objections from citizens 
were vocal and considerable, they did not rise to the level of becoming 
an organized force that could gain the attention of the leadership in 
power.452  In a sense, parallels exist between this situation and the 
circumstances facing the United States at the time when Congress 
passed the Sedition Act, with many vociferous individuals opposing 
the censorship but not enough people to force the issue for the political 
party in power.453          
Examples studied within this article demonstrate that dissent is 
commonly the enemy of new, still-unstable post-revolutionary 
governments.454  Even the best-intentioned leaders resort to measures 
 
 447.  See id. (describing the ways in which the Alien and Sedition Acts seemed poised to 
continue benefitting the already-dominant Federalist Party).  
 448.  Supra notes 243–247 and accompanying text.  
 449.  Supra notes 289–291 and accompanying text.  
 450.  Supra notes 327–329 and accompanying text.  
 451.  See supra Part II.E.  
 452.  Opponents of state-sponsored censorship in Tunisia gained and continue to gain 
global attention for their objections to these measures. Overall, however, these opponents still 
have not gained enough political traction to lead to repeals of these measures. See supra part 
II.E.  
 453.  See supra Part II.A.  
 454.  See supra Part II.  
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preventing negative discourse about them.455  Without a meaningful 
opposition force in place within the nation, however, the national 
government’s leaders may not have any politically motivated reasons 
to lessen the restrictions upon free speech and expression, as these 
leaders benefit from controlling public comments about the 
government and are not facing any threat for their office’s seats outside 
their party machinery.456   
On the surface, one-sided viewpoints and constraints that curb 
criticism about the government appear to strongly benefit the 
individuals currently in power.457  Therefore, a significant group of 
organized opponents to the present leaders is necessary for a post-
revolutionary state to prevent its new political elites from taking the 
easy and unchallenged road of creating speech and expression 
restrictions for the public.      
4.  Easy to Punish, Easy to Avoid 
Every post-revolutionary government examined here punished 
violators of their restrictions upon speech and expression.458  These 
penalties ranged from threats to surveillance to prison sentences to 
torture and death.459  Most likely, these punishments produced a 
chilling effect on speech and expression in these nations.460  Public 
knowledge of these acts likely deterred citizens from testing the waters 
with types of expression that opposed the post-revolutionary 
 
 455.  See id.; see also supra Part III.A–B and infra Part III.C–D.  
 456.  For example, the Federalist Party did not believe that the Sedition Act would anger 
enough of their supporters to outweigh the benefits of censoring what largely amounted to 
Democratic-Republic speech and expression. See supra Part II.A. In an even more extreme 
example, Castro faced no meaningful opposition for the position of head of state, and thus 
believed that he could continue censoring any dissenting speech from the “fringe” of Cuban 
society without actually being toppled from office. See supra Part II.D.  
 457.  See supra Part II (describing examples in the Federal Party-dominated United States, 
France under the control of the Committee of Public Safety, post-revolutionary Russia under 
Czar Nicholas II, Cuba under Castro, and Tunisia and Egypt under control of various leaders 
who restricted speech and expression to reduce political dissent and preserve their positions in 
power).   
 458.  See supra Part II.  
 459.  See supra Part II.   
 460.  Deterrence is a common rationale for punishment, stopping both the offender and 
others within society from repeating the criminalized act. Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical 
Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1984). Thus, if the state 
punishes a particular type of speech or expression, it logically follows that the state holds a 
goal of stopping that individual and other individuals within that jurisdiction from continuing 
that form of speech or expression. 
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government.461 
Such punishments were easily instituted by the post-revolutionary 
states.  Frequently, they arose from hastily constructed laws, or from 
governmental measures that bypassed the lawmaking process entirely.  
In France, for example, the Reign of Terror erupted out of Jacobin 
faction’s takeover in the national legislature, pushing through 
measures such as the wide-ranging Law of Suspects and freely 
allowing the state to execute any alleged dissidents.462  In Russia, Czar 
Nicholas II and Prime Minister Stolypin ordered attacks on anybody 
assumed to be an enemy of the regime and its practices, 
notwithstanding the language in the czar’s October Manifesto that 
claimed to carve out a new level of free speech in the nation.463  Post-
revolutionary states that imposed less draconian measures still 
instituted widespread punishments aimed at restricting expression, 
penalties that almost certainly deterred individuals from exercising the 
freedom of expression that the revolutions had promised.   
Additionally, the effectiveness of these punishments likely 
increased due to the relatively minor consequences of complying with 
the restrictive laws.  If the laws in question prohibited an essential 
function of survival— he ability to earn a living, for instance, or the 
ability to obtain adequate nutrition for an individual and his or her 
family, or the ability to gain satisfactory shelter—then the individual 
calculus might become different.  From a risk-rewards perspective, an 
individual would seem most likely to violate a law and risk a harsh 
punishment if breaching the provision could produce significant 
rewards.464  It seems reasonable to expect that a law restricting or 
eliminating a fundamental need would inspire a large number of people 
to disobey such a measure.  By extension, one would reasonably 
predict that many people would be less likely to break a law where 
violators were punished harshly and where the forbidden acts were 
essentially superfluous.465   
Freedom of speech and expression are hardly superfluous.466  At 
 
 461.  See, e.g., infra text accpompanying notes 462–463.  
 462.  See supra notes 232–247 and accompanying text.  
 463.  See supra notes 289–291.  
 464.  See JONATHAN WOLFF, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 200 
(“[I]f the rewards of breaking the law are high enough, then the risks could be worth taking. 
The cost-benefit analysis can be in favour [sic] of breaking the law.”).  
 465.  Id.  
 466.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 97 (2005) (“In a free society, 
government cannot defend restrictions by pointing to the risk that the speech will prove 
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the same time, however, speech and expression about forbidden topics 
is not vital for survival.  Plenty of people live perfectly happy lives 
without ever publically expressing their views on a contentious topic 
or a controversial position.  A person can lose the ability to speak on a 
tremendous range of issues, yet this loss probably will not directly 
prevent that person from having a shelter and feeding his or her family 
and maintaining a safe, stable life.  
Although this person may want to express his or her views about 
particular subjects, he or she might also recognize that giving up this 
liberty has a far less life-altering effect than facing the guillotine under 
Robespierre’s reign of terror, combating the violence sanctioned by the 
regime of Czar Nicholas II, ending up behind bars and winding up with 
a criminal record, or facing harassment and constant surveillance from 
law enforcement authorities.467  While political theorists widely 
recognize the freedoms of speech and expression as fundamental 
rights, many individuals balancing those rights against the stiff 
penalties they could incur for exercising those rights understandably 
find obedience with state-sponsored censorship to be the easier way to 
go. 
D.  Freedom of Speech and Expression Are Not Primary 
Concerns for Many Citizens   
This last common factor is in some respects the most troubling. 
Government leaders abridging freedom of speech and expression for 
self-interested reasons is problematic, but not entirely unexpected.  
Utilizing newfound power to break promises regarding freedom of 
speech and expression in a post-revolutionary nation is disappointing, 
but stems from an understandable stimulus of trying to preserve that 
new power in a still-unstable state.  Indeed, as recognized already, 
limiting speech and expression in certain areas might even prove 
socially advantageous for a nation seeking to establish the rule of law 
within its borders. 
More complex, however, are the sentiments of the people 
themselves.  Discussions among the preceding paragraphs describe 
 
dangerous or harmful.”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) (describing freedom of speech and expression as “the thinking 
process of the community.”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
591,591–92 (1982) (summarizing a series of important societal values served well by 
permitting a wide-ranging freedom of speech and expression).  
 467.  See supra notes 190–197, 233–247, 289–291, 327–329, 363–371 and accompanying 
text.   
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common government-induced measures encouraging citizens to 
accept—or, at the very least, obey—the quickly imposed constraints 
upon their promised liberties of speech and expression.468  Yet another 
component seems to be at work among the revolutions described here, 
an element that is already apparent within many of the previous 
observations: the average citizen’s overall devaluation of personal 
speech and expression rights. 
Various examples discussed above involve individual prioritizing 
other interests above freedom of speech and expression.  To begin 
with, when harsh punishments against dissenters chilled the 
dissemination of free speech and expression, the people did not rise up 
en masse against the government.469  In part, this lack of revolt came 
because it simply was much easier and safer for the average citizen to 
refrain from the prohibited varieties of expression rather than 
challenging the new regime’s authority.470  On balance, many 
individuals found silence less of a hardship than the likelihood of 
facing police surveillance, prison time, or even execution.471   
Yet this trend goes beyond mere acquiescence to a heavy-handed 
government.  Several instances described within this article represent 
situations where citizens inside a post-revolutionary state actually 
supported strict limits upon free speech and expression.  Safety and 
security from an apparent enemy or other form of danger, for instance, 
trumped free speech and expression in several post-revolutionary 
states — not only in the government’s messages, but also in the 
citizenry’s adoption and promotion of those messages.472  In certain 
states, nationalistic pride in a new government encouraged individuals 
to allow reductions of their speech and expression rights for the 
professed “greater good” of national stability and strength.473  Ardent 
beliefs in particular values led to citizens praising state-imposed 
censorship on speech and expression that criticized, satirized, or 
violated those values.    
This pattern underscores the reality that on the hierarchy of 
 
 468.  See supra Part III A-C.  
 469.  See supra Part III C.4. 
 470.  See id.   
 471.  See id. Some criminologists label this phenomenon as “rational choice theory.” 
LARRY SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY: THE CORE 84–85 (2014); THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL 
CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON OFFENDING 1–10 (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, eds., 
2014).  
 472.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 473.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
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human needs, freedom of speech and expression is nowhere near the 
top.  Far higher on the list of basic human concerns are tangible 
everyday matters such as shelter, nutrition, healthcare, and safety from 
harm.474 Even in nations where these basic needs are met, freedom of 
speech and expression is still often not the paramount concern for 
many people.475  Advancing personal economic interests commonly 
seems to outweigh a desire for freedom of speech, as do the interests 
of enforcing religious or moral beliefs in society.476 
Paradoxically, however, many supporters of uprisings demand 
that the revolution’s outcomes include broader allowance for free 
speech and expression.477  Still, shortly after the revolution ends, these 
individual liberties return to their much lower place on the food 
chain.478 One might even argue that speech and expression are not even 
fundamentally important during the revolutions themselves.  
Debatably, the actual tipping points that led to revolution in the 
examples described above generally were economic problems.479  
Thus, one could reasonably ask whether these nations would have seen 
revolts under conditions of equivalent government repression but 
greater economic stability.  
This is not a referendum on the character or commitment of 
citizens in post-revolutionary nations.  In fact, it makes sense that most 
individuals would prioritize a broad range of tangible needs, wants, or 
goals above the rather elusive and often-contentious objective of 
freedom of expression.  In day-to-day living, restrictions on the ability 
to earn money or to receive adequate medical care or other material 
objectives have a concrete impact.  By contrast, the impact of 
restrictions upon freedom of expression in an individual’s daily life 
may seem only frustrating or discouraging, or even completely 
inconsequential.  This becomes particularly important in a post-
revolutionary state.  After passing through an extended period of 
 
 474.  Or, as several Tunisian citizens aptly described it to one commentator: “What use is 
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 476.  See, e.g., supra notes 294–297, 374–378 and accompanying text.   
 477.  See generally supra Part I.  
 478.  See supra Part II.  
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summoned the Estates-General, thus preventing one of the key events that triggered the 
revolution. See THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
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turmoil and strain, many people can view freedom of speech and 
expression as a liberty that they can easily live without—and perhaps 
even live better without—as long as the post-revolutionary 
government is addressing their other, more tangible needs.   
Of course, this statement does not apply to all people in a post-
revolutionary state.  Plenty of individuals vehemently argue against 
speech and expression prohibitions, often putting themselves at great 
risk to do so.480  Still, in trying to discern why post-revolutionary 
governments so often succeed in breaking promises regarding liberties 
of speech and expression, one cannot ignore the fact that for many 
citizens, these rights are not by themselves worth a new fight.  Indeed, 
a consequential number of individuals view government restrictions 
upon speech and expression as measures that are actually beneficial 
overall, worthy of advancement regardless of what the revolution itself 
seemingly promised to achieve.481 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The question of why post-revolutionary governments often 
quickly abridge their promises to legally preserve freedom of 
expression is a challenging and disconcerting inquiry.  In an attempt to 
answer it, this article studied both the development and the aftermath 
of six revolutions from three centuries: the American Revolution of 
1783, the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1905, 
the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the “Arab Spring” revolutions of 
2011 in Egypt and Tunisia.  In each of these uprisings, the 
revolutionaries demanded legal safeguards of freedom of expression 
from their government, and leaders promised this liberty if the 
revolution brought them to power or permitted them to remain in 
power.  However, shortly after each of these revolutions concluded, 
the new government assuming control or the holdover government that 
vowed to reform quickly reversed course, instituting stringent 
measures that strictly controlled speech and expression in their nations.  
After reviewing these revolutions and the immediate post-
revolution restrictions on individual expression, certain common 
factors became apparent.  To begin with, revolutions encourage leaders 
to make seemingly absolute promises regarding freedom of expression 
 
 480.  See, e.g., supra notes 190–194, 243–247, 263–264, 325–339, 363–371 and 
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that they either do not intend to keep or discover that they cannot keep 
within the day-to-day work of governing a nation.  Upon assuming 
power or managing to retain power, post-revolutionary governments 
tend to fear the still-volatile national climate that produced this social 
upheaval in the first place.  This apprehension often leads post-
revolutionary leaders to dramatically restrict liberty of expression, 
reducing dissent and opposition among the citizenry and providing an 
appearance of unified support for the regime in power. 
To legitimize these expression-chilling measures, and to gain 
acceptance or even support for these limitations from the public, post-
revolutionary states employ a variety of strategies. Many post-
revolutionary leaders convince citizens that abridging certain types of 
expression is necessary for the public’s own security, allowing the 
government to easily identify the enemies of the people and thus keep 
the loyal, law-abiding population safe.  In the aftermath of a period of 
violent unrest and upheaval, this rhetoric frequently strikes a 
particularly positive chord with individuals seeking safety and security 
after such a turbulent and unstable time.  
Some leaders find success in playing upon the new nationalism 
that arises after a revolution supplants one regime with a new 
government, convincing people to allow limits on their personal 
expression for the “greater good” of uniting the nation.  An overall lack 
of well-organized opposition forces to speak against the leaders in 
control following a revolution commonly encourages state-sponsored 
censorship, as the political faction in power does not receive enough 
of a push from their opponents to let dissenting voices be heard.  Harsh 
penalties that post-revolutionary leaders commonly inflict upon people 
who violate the state’s constraints on speech and expression strongly 
discourage citizens from defying these laws.  To many people, the loss 
of freedom of expression does not outweigh the severity of the 
punishment that would likely result from disobeying the post-
revolutionary state’s restrictions.  
Beyond examining post-revolutionary governments’ strategies, 
however, another common factor illustrated in this article focuses on 
the sentiments of the people themselves. Freedom of expression is 
intangible and difficult to fully define.  Thus, when it comes to making 
hard choices, personal liberties in this area evidently are not the highest 
priority for most individuals.  Revolutionaries often clamor for 
freedom of expression, yet the post-revolutionary states studied here 
demonstrate that most people are unlikely to revolt over the issue of 
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speech and expression by itself.  Other tangible day-to-day concerns 
understandably appear to be matters of greater focus for the majority 
of the populace, focusing their attention on issues that clearly and 
immediately affect their daily lives rather than the more subtle 
magnitude of speech and expression rights.  Indeed, a significant 
number of individuals openly support certain governmental 
restrictions upon speech and expression, demonstrating the degree to 
which they prioritize other values and aspects of their lives above this 
particular freedom.    
From this discussion emerges another equally troubling question: 
whether it is even possible for a post-revolutionary state to exist 
without breaking its vows to the people regarding freedom of 
expression.  Most likely, no state could survive under the absolute 
degree of freedom of expression that many revolutionary leaders 
appear to promise.  Even for relatively stable states that highly prize 
these liberties, some level of restriction upon speech and expression 
remains necessary to prevent complete chaos within the nation.  In the 
still-unsteady aftermath of a revolution, a government’s need to 
exercise some degree of control over the actions of its citizens becomes 
even more important to prevent the state’s utter dissolution.  
Because of this, a post-revolutionary government that did not 
heavily tread upon the speech and expression liberties of its citizens 
would need to be remarkably self-disciplined, far better at keeping its 
own powers in check than any of the post-revolutionary states studied 
here. Such a government would need to conquer its apprehensions of 
the populace that installed it in power in the first place, permitting them 
to express viewpoints and ideas that go against the government’s 
views, or even against the government itself.  Such a government 
would need to restrain itself from using the many instruments in its 
toolkit that could persuade many people that substantial state-imposed 
censorship was not only justified, but beneficial.  Perhaps most 
importantly, such a government would need to convince the citizens 
that freedom of expression is a fundamental component of their lives, 
not something to shy away from in fear that it will weaken the nation 
and cause greater instability.  Whether a post-revolutionary 
government could ever fulfill all of these criteria and remain in power 
is a question still awaiting an answer.  
For now, suffice it to say that throughout the centuries, post-
revolutionary governments have engaged in similar practices to 
quickly and effectively melt their promises of freedom of speech and 
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expression.  The balances between liberty and stability, and the 
consequences of each, underlie both the post-revolutionary 
governmental decisions to abridge this freedom and the subsequent 
reactions of citizens regarding these constraints.  A deeper examination 
into the positive and negative outcomes of these acts will be beneficial 
in the future — not only to understand the dynamics of personal 
liberties in post-revolutionary states, but to improve the overall 
comprehension of the value of free speech and expression as a whole.  
 
